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Letter from the Editor
Readers,
Each year the Gettysburg Historical Journal of Gettysburg College summons the best of the
best student compositions of history for publication. Resultantly, each year the editorial board
for the Journal is swamped with student submissions featuring a wide array of topics from the
categories of history, art history and historic fiction. Since many of the submissions are deserving
of publication, the selection process is extraordinarily competitive, as well as difficult for the
staff of the Journal. Out of the many submissions submitted for this year’s edition, presented
here are the best of the best:
In Currents of Liberty, Seas of Change, Skye Montgomery finds that the Atlantic Ocean, while
presenting an insurmountable barrier between enslaved blacks and their homelands, also provided
a rare opportunity for equality. Black seaman frequently found a degree of liberty in the rigorous
discipline of shipboard life and became inspiring models of empowerment to their own people,
undermining the efforts of slaveholders to create a docile labor force.
Next, we turn to Brett Jackson who focuses on the jurisprudential treatment of women in the
Puritan era. It is commonly assumed that the legal status of American women has been a linear
progression from total repression to modern day equity. In this narrative of sequentially gained
status, Puritan law has stood as the exemplar of America’s most oppressive treatment of women
under law. As Jackson demonstrates in Revealing Zion’s Daughters, it is simply not true.
Brian Matthew Jordan proffers a brief history of the Eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry in ‘The
Regiment Bore a Most Conspicuous Part.’ Following the regiment through the Civil War using
the letters of participants and contemporary accounts and newspapers, Jordan periscopes
inward to find in these Ohioans − and in their apogee at Gettysburg − the larger meanings of
the nation’s fiery trial.
Subsequently, Joseph D. Gasparro returns us to Pontiac’s Rebellion in The Desired Effect.
After the French and Indian War, the ink on the 1763 Treaty of Paris was barely dry when the
victorious British had to deal with this multi-tribe insurgence. Upset over Britain’s new policies,
the Native Americans took ten forts, pushing the British to desperate measures including the
distribution of blankets infected with smallpox to the Indians.
Finally, Daniel Scotto examines the possibility of Soviet involvement in the attempted assassination
of Pope John Paul II. He suggests in his Greninger Prize winning Pope John Paul II, the Assassination
Attempt, and the Soviet Union that there is substantial evidence of Soviet complicity.
As will be seen, Gettysburg College students strive above and beyond expectations of undergraduate
level historic writing. The high levels of integrity seen in the following compositions can derive
only from a student’s devotion and willpower supported by the prominent professors and
mentors that Gettysburg College provides. What makes the Gettysburg Historical Journal stand
out among others is the fact that from conception, submissions, selection and collation, the
Journal is processed solely through the hands of students. Both the authors of the essays and
the Journal’s editorial board devote vast amounts of time and energy making the Gettysburg
Historical Journal a success. It is my pleasure to present here a true testament to the hard work
and dedication of the students of Gettysburg College.
Kevin Bowman
General Editor
5
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Currents of Liberty, Seas of Change: Black Sailors as
Subversive Agents of Freedom
in the Early Republic


Skye Montgomery
Years after being kidnapped from his native Ibo village as a young boy, Olaudah Equiano
vividly recalled his wonder at seeing a European ship for the first time.1 Although he failed
to realize it at the time, that same ship, and the Atlantic currents it navigated, would shortly
transport him and millions of his countrymen to lives of slavery on the far shores of a distant
continent. In addition to providing a convenient avenue for the initial transport of slaves, water
enabled the development of a trade network linking scattered plantations in the Caribbean to
centers of trade in North America and Europe where the products of coerced black labor were
bought and sold. Even more detrimental to African identity than the systematic exploitation the
sea enabled was the insurmountable barrier it presented to the continuance of native customs
and identities. Like the slave ships that traversed the ocean currents, however, black culture
eventually subverted the rigid order imposed by nature. The presence of black sailors onboard
the ships which sustained the colonial Atlantic World created an unparalleled opportunity for
strengthening black identity. The seamen assumed the roles of cultural ambassadors, spreading
word of the diverse cultures and patterns of life they encountered in their travels to their brothers
and sisters in bondage. Capitalizing on the inherent inequality of shipboard life to assert their
identities as autonomous equals, black sailors brought hope and, occasionally, freedom to
American slaves, all the while undermining the efforts of slaveholders to create a docile labor
force.
In the eighteenth century, the first generation of manumitted blacks quickly discovered
that the promise of freedom obtained in the wake of the American Revolution did not extend
to equality. While African Americans still toiled under the lash in the South, their northern
counterparts vainly searched for economic opportunities through which they could support
fledgling families and prove their dignity as human beings. While deeply entrenched racism
closed many occupations to them, black males consistently found employment on the sea.
Ultimately, myriad economic, social, and historical factors account for the acceptance of black
labor by the maritime industry. In the most immediate sense, black labor served an essential
function in the chronically undermanned merchant marine. More important than their mere
availability, however, were the skills many blacks had acquired through a vibrant seafaring
1

Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, ed. Robert J. Allison (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1995), 53.
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tradition. Even before the massive demographic reorientation of African Americans around
port cities following 1790, black faces had been a common sight in American dockyards.2
In northern and southern coastal cities, slaves like Briton Hammon petitioned their masters
for the right to hire themselves out for voyages and runaways had traditionally sought illicit
employment on seagoing vessels. Although their heritage of seafaring gave blacks the skills to
attract potential employers, the nature of shipboard life ultimately secured their acceptance.
Unlike the plantation economy and many other land based industries, seafaring
offered little opportunity for the physical segregation of the races. The physical confines of the
sailors’ living space inevitably compelled blacks and whites to live in close proximity and the
communal aspects of their work, as well as its shared dangers and discomforts, only strengthened
their solidarity.3 For all the egalitarian qualities of life before the mast, however, seafaring was
characterized by a rigid hierarchy defining each sailor’s specific duties and the degree of social
consideration he deserved.4 However, as W. Jeffrey Bolster has shown, race alone did not
predestine blacks for the lowest duties. Rather, a host of other qualifications determined their
placement within the maritime hierarchy.5 Through their talents and initiative, black men rose
through the ranks to become officers and some eventually commanded their own vessels.6
Ironically, however, the same career that offered black seamen a tantalizing taste of
equality and freedom frequently placed them in the power of officers who tried to deprive
them of both. In their survey of the laboring class that formed the backbone of the burgeoning
Atlantic World, Linebaugh and Rediker identify the ship as the forerunner of the modern factory.7
Although this interpretation helps to contextualize the brutality employed by captains in the
eighteenth century in order to secure the submissive obedience of their crews, it overlooks its
parallel to the oppressive measures leveled against slaves laboring in agricultural production.
Like planters, sea captains intimidated the men in their power with arbitrary displays of violence.
Some practices, like the public flogging of sailors with an instrument specifically designed to cause
excruciating pain, so closely mirrored the tactics of slaveholders that white seamen frequently
referred to themselves as negroes.8 In addition to corporal punishment, owners of maritime
labor encouraged restrictive legislation designed to emulate the discriminatory stipulations
of southern slave codes. Laws were enacted limiting the mobility of sailors unless they could
present positive proof of employment and a law, in language reminiscent of the Fugitive Slave
Act, empowered citizens to apprehend runaway seamen.9
2
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One of the planters’ primary tactics against black revolt was the intentional sundering
of African linguistic ties. When Africans were loaded upon ships bound for the Americas, a
contemporary observer explained,
The means used by those who trade to Guinea to keep the Negroes quiet is to choose them
from severall parts of ye Country, of different Languages; so that they cannot act joyntyly,
in soe farr as they understand not one another.10
Even as the Africans learned the language of their captors, planters attempted to curtail
communication between plantations by restricting the mobility of their slaves.11 In addition to
the systematic suppression of black communication, many planters consistently discouraged any
emergent self-respect in their slaves by denying them the opportunity to practice skilled trades.
Although many blacks resignedly submitted to their masters’ dominance, the sea provided an
alluring avenue of escape for the intrepid few which dared to attempt escape.
Port cities became havens for runaway slaves because their cosmopolitan compositions
often camouflaged black fugitives from detection. In addition to allowing the slave to
demonstrate his or her own ingenuity by eluding slaveholders in a bustling crowd, ports
often brought slaves into contact with sympathetic sailors. Such men, regardless of their race,
evidently saw in fugitive slaves a poignant reminder of their own fragile liberty and frequently
aided runaways to freedom. Few historiographical surveys document the impact of individual
runaways on planters’ authority. Quite possibly the effect of such subversive labor tactics was
so significant that planters hesitated to acknowledge it in writing. Whether or not accounts of
runaways were ever committed to paper by literate blacks, their escapes undoubtedly figured
prominently in discussions between slaves. Each runaway dealt both a tangible blow to his or
her owner’s purse, as well as a subtle symbolic blow to his absolute authority.
If a runaway slave damaged his or her master’s image, the appearance of an autonomous
black male within the plantation economy eroded the image of racial inferiority slaveholders
so diligently instilled in their chattel. Whereas the majority of manumitted slaves in the South
were old and feeble, black sailors typified masculine virility.12 Even more galling to Southerners
was the presence of black sailors in recognized positions of authority. Prior to 1822, ships with
all-black crews, commanded by black masters, frequently docked in southern harbors. The
mere existence of these men among the enslaved exposed the deceitful teachings of slaveholders
and kindled black resistance to enslavement. Even when slaves dutifully returned to their
masters after spending time at sea, they were likely to display behavior deemed unsuitable. As
one Caribbean planter observed, “[He] never knew a Boy, who had been at Sea, of any use on
a Plantation.”13 More dangerous than their blossoming autonomy in the planters’ view was the
10
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David Simson as quoted in Rediker, 48.
Betty Wood, Slavery in Colonial America 1619-1776 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 61.
W. Jeffery Bolster, Black Jacks: African-American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 213.
Scott, 38.
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tendency of black sailors to disseminate Republican ideals of liberty and natural rights among
the enslaved. In 1826, the Bahamian House of Assembly noted that the number of black
slaves employed around the island were certain to, “disseminate among the slave population
generally a taste for many of the comforts of civilized life.”14 However black sailors may have
defined the “comforts of civilized life,” they almost certainly held that slavery was hindering
their attainment.
Although his very appearance in the South subverted the artificial racial stratification
planters had nurtured for centuries, the very nature of a sailor’s profession made him capable of
posing an even greater threat to slaveholding society. Through their travels, black sailors helped
to regenerate the connections between the far-flung communities of their people rendered asunder
by slavery and transmit information about alternative ways of life that the enslaved could only
imagine. The importance of the merchant marine as a newsmonger can only be determined
by an examination of the extent to which slaveholders attempted to suppress unfavorable news
before it reached their slaves. One of the most contentious events in the colonial world, the slave
insurrection in St. Domingue, was also one of the most alarming to Southerners. Fittingly, news
of the initial carnage sweeping the island was first carried to Charleston by a merchant vessel on
September 9, 1791.15 Slaveholders quickly mobilized to neutralize the reports of racial rebellion
in their press and personal correspondence in order to allay the enthusiasm of their own slaves
for a similar bloodletting. Although the American South rarely regarded the fledgling Republic
of Haiti with anything less than wary suspicion, the region’s newspapers were more charitable
towards the initial revolutionary violence than the subsequent attempts of the black nation to
govern itself. Whereas papers published lurid accounts of black atrocities on the island, which
probably inspired more than one black slave in Charleston to harbor murderous designs, they
consistently ridiculed the Republic of Haiti as symbol of economic decay and further proof of
the dependency of African-Americans.16 In addition to racially biased press coverage, southern
states attempted to censor the events on St. Domingue by placing limitations on the import of
slaves from the region and the immigration of refugees, especially the gens de coleur.17
In contrast to the pitiful scenarios depicted by the southern press and planters
themselves, black sailors heralded the Republic of Haiti as an achievement which proved their
racial equality with whites. The extraordinary mobility of the sailors frequently outpaced the free
flow of information in the South, and they played an increasingly important role as sources of
information about the true nature of the Republic. The sailors consistently pointed with pride
to the nation which had managed to throw off the burden of tyranny much as the American
colonies had done decades earlier, and heralded the formation of a government on the island
as a vindication of their ability to wield political power. Although their positive endorsement
14
15
16

17

Quoted in Bolster, Black Jacks, 135.
Scott, 42.
Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano in the Caribbean (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 		
Press, 1988), 20, 89.
Ibid., 141.
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of the efforts on St. Domingue directly challenged the rhetoric of slaveholders, black sailors
occasionally went to even greater lengths to sabotage the hegemony of white southerners.
One of the most epic attempted slave revolts in American history had its genesis in
the ideas of equality and self-worth promoted by the service of black seamen. Denmark Vesey
had been a sailor in his youth and had acquired the cosmopolitan views and worldliness that so
characterized his fellow black compatriots. In addition to introducing him to exotic cultures
and ways of life, however, Vesey’s voyages helped him become proficient in French, Gullah,
and Creole.18 Prior to the restrictions leveled at French émigrés by the southern states, Vesey
probably freely conversed with Haitian refugees in their native language. In addition to the
ideological debt Vesey owed to his seafaring experiences, they figured very prominently in his
planned slave uprising in Charleston. Subsequent testimony given at the trials of the conspirators
revealed that Vesey had established open contact with the Republic of Haiti through a black
sailor, and planned to sail with his followers to the island after they had reduced Charleston to
rubble.19 Although planters had always resented the subversive influence of black sailors, the
trial of Denmark Vesey quickly educated them as to how dangerous the seamen truly were.
Of the 35 conspirators condemned to death, over half were employed in Charleston’s port.20
In the wake of the trial and execution of the slaves involved in Vesey’s attempted uprising in
1822, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana passed the
Negro Seaman Acts in an effort to curtail the freedoms of black sailors.21 Ships entering ports
in these states were required by law to incarcerate black crewmen in city jails. In addition to
relinquishing black sailors to the authorities during the duration of the stay in port, captains
were compelled to offer proof that they intended to reclaim all their crewmen before departure.
If they were not claimed by their officers, black seamen could be sold into slavery to recover
the expense of their imprisonment.22 Although moderately successful in isolating black sailors
from the slave populations, the seamen continued to transmit information from their prison
cells and, with their very presence, undermine the authority of white planters.
In the crucible of inequality that was the ship, black sailors managed to forge positive
identities for themselves and their race. By ceding control of their fates to the caprices of captains
and subjecting themselves to a form of exploitation akin to that endured by their brothers and
sisters in bondage, black sailors won a degree of autonomy. Through their willing and unwilling
voyages to the far corners of the world, they experienced different cultures and peoples, which
they enthusiastically transmitted to those bound to the earth of the plantation through an
undisrupted network of communication. Although their numbers would steadily decline as the
economic centers of America shifted towards factory production, blacks continued to form a
18

19
20
21

22

Edward A. Pearson, introduction to Designs Against Charleston: The Trial Record of the Denmark Vesey Slave Conspiracy of 1822, ed. Edward A.
Pearson (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1999), 29-30.
Ibid., 231-232, 238.
Ibid., 44.
Philip M. Hamer, “Great Britain, the United States, and the Negro Seaman Acts, 1822-1848”, The Journal of Southern History 1 (February, 		
1935): 3-28.
Ibid., 4.
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visible presence in American shipping through the Civil War. Ultimately, the host of unnamed
and largely unsung heroes of the sea forged identities for themselves characterized by a degree
of liberty disproportionate to their actual autonomy onboard ship. They fashioned themselves
into models of what colonial slaveholders most feared: skilled, self-aware, cosmopolitan
freemen––symbols of hope and racial pride, and prophets of resistance for millions of enslaved
blacks.
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Revealing Zion’s Daughters:
Women in Puritan Jurisprudence


Brett Jackson
The legal status of American women has consistently been portrayed as a linear
progression flowing from a colonial jurisprudential repression and exclusion to a modern-day
legal equity and a female influence within every aspect of justice.1 In this narrative of sequentially
gained status, seventeenth-century Puritan law has stood as the exemplar of America’s most
repressive jurisprudential treatment of women. However, when its characteristics are triangulated
and its subordination of women is juxtaposed with its inclusion of a female voice, a new
conception of America’s first legal system is seen. The notion of a linear progression is thus
replaced with an understanding that the modern day equity enjoyed by women is a product of
extensive legal fluctuation. Puritan women were clearly characterized as the subordinate gender
and their secondary status evidenced in the symbolic silencing of heretical females and in legal
coverture. However, stemming from the Puritan concept of a “Godly-society” attained through
equitable legal status, New England women enjoyed liberal divorce laws and a significant presence
within the court room when compared with contemporary England and the nineteenth century
jurisprudence, which relegated women to the non-public sphere. Thus, as Laurel Thatcher Ulrich
emphasizes, we “need to move from static concepts like “patriarchal New England society” to
more intricate questions about the interplay of values and practice over time. Zion’s daughters
have for too long been hidden.”2
The Puritans explicitly believed in female inferiority. Even as Protestants “in revolt
against the male Catholic hierarchy and convinced of the equality of souls before God, they
nevertheless insisted on women’s proper subordination within the family.”3 John Calvin endorsed
male-dominance in saying, “Let the woman be satisfied with her state of subjection, and not
take it amiss that she is made inferior to the more distinguished sex.”4 Portrait renditions of
the family reflected the polarization of gender before 1750, distinguishing a dominant group
of men and breeched boys from the women and girls dressed in petticoats. Thus, as Mary Beth
Norton wrote, “If a girl could be viewed as a miniature adult, the grown woman could be viewed

1

2

3
4

Jill K. Conway, The Female Experience in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century America: A Guide to the History of American Women, (New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc, 1982), 39.
Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, “Vertuous Women Found: New England Ministerial Literature, 1668-1735” in Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck
eds., A Heritage of Her Own: Toward a New Social History of American Women (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 76.
Sara M. Evans, Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 22.
Ibid.
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as a more advanced child.”5 While there was much variation in the colonies, “the civil code of
the New England colonies embodied a concept of marital unity striking in its expression of the
patriarchal ideal that women’s private interests had to be subordinated to the greater familial
whole.”6 The familial relationship most reflective of the patriarchy was a woman’s relationship
to her husband. John Milton’s Paradise Lost defines this relation as “he for God only, she for
God in him.”7 Thus, the subjection of a woman to a man parallels that of a man to God and
is indicative of the female role within society as a whole. Indeed, the church was essential in
espousing the essentiality of women’s pious acquiescence to the will of the patriarchy.
Women’s subordinate legal status was bolstered by church sermons like Cotton Mather’s
Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion. In this 1692 oration, he said:
As for her love to her husband, I may say, ‘Tis even strong as death, many waters cannot
quench it; neither can the floods drown it. . . .When she reads that Prince Edward in his
wars against the Turks, being stabbed with a poisoned knife, his princess did suck the
poison out of his wonder with her own royal mouth; she finds in her own heart a principle
disposing her to show her own husband as great a love. . . . But her love to her husband
will also admit, yeah, and produce the fear of, a cautious diligence never to displease him.
While she looks upon him as her guide, by the constitution of God . . . she does not fear
his blows, yet she does fear his frowns, being loath in any way to grieve him, or cause a
headache in the family by offending him. . . . In every lawful thing she submits her will
and sense to his, where she cannot with calm reason convince him of inexpediences, and
instead of grudging or captious contradiction, she acts as if there were but one mind in
two bodies. . . . ‘tis by the kindness, the sweetness, the goodness of her expressions that
she gives law unto him.8
Thus, Puritan women were directed by the church to honor their husbands and
dutifully submit themselves to his will in order to ensure the health of the marriage and the
efficiency of the household. As Thomas Gataker said in his 1620 Marriage Duties, “There can
bee no ordinary intercourse and commerce or conversing between person and person, but
there must be a precedencie on the one part, and a yielding of it on the other.”9 This familial
hierarchy was analogized to the state writ small; the role of husband and wife represented a
“little commonwealth.”10 Robert Cleaver spoke of this in his A Godlie Forme of Householde
Government, published in 1598 saying, “The governours of families . . . upon whom the charges
5
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of governmet lyeth, though unequally, are, first the Cheefe governour, which is the Husband,
secondly a fellow helper, which is the Wife.”11 Thus the wife’s role within the home was “to guide
the house and not guide the husband.”12 As a microcosm of the state-order, the relationship
between married men and women modeled the social hierarchy.13 Male-governance from
husbands and the colonial patriarchy was fundamental in the maintenance of social order. In
accordance with the family-state analogy, women were to be equally deferential to both their
husbands and the colonial church-state, while maintaining a “goodness” and “sweetness” toward
the larger community. The prosecution of female dissidents and accusations of witchcraft leveled
at women who failed to fulfill their proscribed role demonstrates the male dominance of Puritan
culture and its value of female conformity.
The church-state of the 17th century effectively prosecuted religious non-conformists as
well as transgressors of civil law. While criminals of both genders were put on trial to exemplify
the social castigation resulting from immorality, the punishment of female dissidents worked
on another level to reinforce women’s subjugation to the authority of the patriarchal governance
and to men as a group. Anne Hutchinson was “the most famous heretic of Massachusetts Bay
Colony” and was banished for holding home lectures which promoted antinomianism to
guests of both genders.14 “Antinomianism stressed salvation through inner regeneration rather
than through conformity to external rules imposed by church and state; this heresy threatened
the stability of the Puritan community.”15 By preaching this ideal, Hutchinson promoted the
questioning of religious dogma while also challenging the assumption that women should be
non-participants in church affairs. While her prosecution was based on theological heresy, her
high-profile banishment rested on “her unprecedented demand that she, a woman, be permitted
to think for herself about God and provoke others, women included, into doing the same.”16
John Winthrop, governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony labeled her “a woman of haughty
and fierce carriage . . . of a nimble wit and active spirit, a very voluble tongue, more bold than a
man, though in understanding and judgment inferior to many women.”17 According to Eleanor
Fitzpatrick, by “maintaining that an individual could commune directly with God, Mistress
Hutchinson was claiming equality for herself and everybody else with the men who ruled.”18
Hugh Peter, an additional interrogator told Hutchinson, “you have stept out of your place,
you have rather bine a Husband than a Wife, and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate
than a Subject.”19 Her self-assertion had therefore threatened the male dominance in familial,
11
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religious and political spheres.20 While the Puritans appreciated the midwifery of Hutchinson,
they cited the Apostle Paul and condemned women who gained followers by “speaking things
which they ought not.”21 Frey and Morton conclude that “Hutchinson’s open questioning of
the moral and intellectual qualifications of the political religious leadership threatened the male
hegemony, especially since she herself had a wide and powerful following.”22
While trials like that of Anne Hutchinson worked to “silence women as political
beings and religious leaders,” witchcraft allegations also surfaced in the 17th century to censure
offensive or rebellious women and to purge the Puritan community of undesirables.23 According
to Cornelia Hughes Dayton, the Puritan community “unquestioningly cast women as witches
and condoned a prosecutorial double standard for accused men and women such that twentyeight women and only seven men were hanged for the crime of witchcraft.”24 With a limited
intellect and a lower-social status, a woman was thought to be more vulnerable to the Devil’s
influence.25 The trials in Salem, Massachusetts point to the conclusion that accused witches
were overwhelmingly married or widowed women between the ages of forty-one and sixty, the
age in which they were both at the height of their social power and on the verge of losing status
with the onset of menopause.26 Cotton Mather’s recording of a specter sighting by an afflicted
girl attests to the conception of witches as older women: “What a dreadful Sight are You! An Old
Woman, an Old Servant of the Divel!”27 Many accused women had developed a reputation for
petulant relations with neighbors and a poor rapport with the community as a whole. Mrs. Anne
Hibbens who was known for her “unnatural crabbedness of…temper” was excommunicated
following an argument with the town carpenters over their work on her home.28 In 1656
after the death of her husband, who was a well-respected Bostonian, Hibbens was convicted
and executed as a witch. It is thus evident that witchcraft allegations functioned within New
England society as a mode of social control. The process operated in a straightforward manner
on any individual who pondered action censured by the community. It was understood that
if one carried out such a violation they would make themselves more vulnerable to the charge
of witchcraft.29 The fact that this control mechanism primarily affected women is congruent
with the patriarchal nature of Puritan society.
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The most pervasive and effectual legal restraint placed on women in accordance
with a Puritan patriarchy was the policy of coverture. Within a section of Cotton Mather’s
Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion, in which he defines the proper role for widows he bolds
Isaiah 54.5: THY MAKER IS THEY HUSBAND.30 It was through clerical bolstering such as
this, that the common law practice of coverture retained such an extensive and enduring hold
in America. Indeed, coverture for women remained fixed fifteen decades after the governor of
Connecticut held the first pre-trial examinations for the New Haven court in 1639. As William
Blackstone explained this legal status years later, “The very being or legal existence of the woman
is suspended during the marriage, or at least is… consolidated into that of the husband: under
whose wing, protection and cover, she performs every thing…in our law …her condition…is
called coverture.”31 England described the policy in The Lawes Resolution for Women’s Rights
of 1632: “A woman as soon as she is married, is a covert, in Latin, nupta, that is, veild, as it
were, clouded and overshadowed, she hath lost her streame . . . To a married woman, her new
self is her superior, her companion, her master.”32 Puritans adopted this foundational doctrine
of English common law, also known as “civil death,” because they understood it as religiously
significant. Civil death rested on Genesis 2:22-23: “And Adam said this is now bone of my
bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of man.
Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife and they
shall be one flesh.”33 Thus, the relationship between a “feme covert” and her husband was
accepted as mirroring that of a vassal to a lord.34
In accordance with the Puritan conception religious civil society, the legal diction
in The Lawes Resolution of Women’s Rights describing coverture was flavored with a moral and
religious tone. Women’s subordinate status was a punishment for Eve’s seduction of Adam:
exiled from the Garden of Eden, enjoined to labor, Eve because she had helped to seduce
her husband has inflicted on her a especial bane. In sorrow shall thou bring fourth thy
children, thy desires shall be subject to they husband, and he shall rule over thee . . . See
here the reason . . . that women have no voice in Parliament, they make no laws, the consent
to none, they abrogate none. All of them are understood either married or to be married
and their desires are subject to their husband . . . 35
This explanation of coverture was adopted throughout New England and the policy
ensured a husband’s dominion over wife as she was prohibited thereafter from “alienating
property, entering into contracts, bringing lawsuits, or making a will without the consent and,
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often, the joint action of her husband.”36 In contrast to married femes covert, single women
and widows held the status of “femes sole,” legal persons free of male-control. Single women
over eighteen and widowed women had status within the legal system as individuals. They
could sue under their own name, write wills, and bequeath property. Coverture ensured that
the funds and property belonging to a woman would be subsumed under the ownership of her
husband. Henrietta East Caine, who had owned a profitable millinery shop located on Boston’s
Marlborough Street lamented that “her Friends will not supply her with Goods to carry on her
business as before,” because she was still under a marriage contract to her bigamist, deserter
husband.37 A woman with a large savings was at risk of becoming destitute due to her husband’s
fiscal mismanagement; Mary Hunt of Boston was impoverished when her husband spent her
fortune of fifteen hundred pounds before deserting her and her small children.38 Thus, Henrietta
and Mary were powerless to conduct business to their own economic benefit while still married.
As Nancy Cott suggests, the wives’ “adherence to the norm of economic dependence resulted
in their own economic powerlessness.”39 While a widow, a feme sole, was entitled to dower
rights over one-third of her husband’s land, her claim over his larger estate upon her death was
void and the land bequeathed to her husband’s male heirs. Thus, the patriarchy was sustained
as “wealth, most frequently defined as land, was transmitted from one generation of men to
another.”40 Indeed, a father’s will usually granted a daughter only one-half of the inheritance
reserved for her brothers, and she usually gained personal property rather than real-estate.41
Coverture ensured women’s non-connection with property, since married women legally
owned none. Contemporary wills attest to this fact. As a legal entity, women could only write
wills with their husband’s consent. Widows or women who had gained permission to write a
will could bequeath their own property, usually amounting to household goods and clothes,
and possibly livestock. Anne Burt, a Massachusetts resident wrote a will in 1664 in which, after
granting livestock to her children stipulated a beneficiary for each of her possessions, listing:
I give to Elizabeth basset a new feather bed A boulster and a pillow and a pillow beare A
blankit and a Rouge and i give to Sarah bassit my ould feather bed a boulster and pillow
. . . A tapsterri Covering and i give to meriam bassit A Copper ketel, A table Cltoh and
half A doson of napkins and a ew shep, han toweland I give to mary bassit my biggest
eiorn pot.42
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Women’s coverture had remarkable longevity, only in mid-nineteenth century as state
legislatures began to enact married women’s property rights, did “the edifice of coverture start
to crumble.”43 Its legacy was an effective suppression of female legal action long after symbolic
silencing of maleficent women as witches became outmoded. The wholesale acceptance of
coverture within Puritan society demonstrates that New England’s legal liberalities regarding
women did not flow from an abandonment of British patriarchy. Indeed, the social ascendancy
of the husband according to James Johnson was “but a bow to social condition in seventeenth
century England.”44
The New England Puritans, while implementing the British common law as blueprint
for their jurisprudence, exhibited a significant departure from English legal doctrine by
sanctioning divorce within their colonies. As their contemporaries in England were “locked into
marital vows for life,” women in New England were granted this considerable legal advantage.45
The conception of law in the New World was heavily influenced by the Protestant Reformation
which denied the sacramental identity of marriage. Within English common law, marriage as
a sacrament was an indissoluble contract. Annulments through ecclesiastical courts or special
acts of Parliament were reserved only for the wealthy.46 American colonies founded with an
Anglican majority adhered to the sacramental concept of England, and within their jurisdiction a
consummated marriage was not to be broken.47 More liberally, Puritan New England introduced
marriage as a civil contract and divorces were an option in cases of desertion, prolonged absence,
adultery, or bigamy, with the injured party retaining the right to remarry. Divorce proceedings
were heard in secular courts, and the proceedings were based on Luther’s reasoning as explained
by Dayton: “as with any other contract the gross misbehavior of one spouse in breaking the
terms, notably through neglect or infidelity should abrogate the contract and free the aggrieved
party to remarry.”48 New England provided for “absolute” divorce, or divorce a vinculo, in
contrast to Anglican colonies which limited divorce to a legal separation with no right of
either party to remarry.49 In addition to their doctrinal dissent regarding Anglican sacrament,
New England lawmakers favored liberal divorce policies in order to curtail the widespread
bigamy they saw in England and in colonies in which divorce was forbidden. Upon witnessing
abandoned wives living in destitution because their coverture prevented them from engaging
in commerce and lawsuits in pursuit of self-sufficiency, Puritan leaders saw a social benefit in
freeing them from their precarious position. According to Nancy Woloch, “Such arrangements
satisfied the Puritan desire to ensure family harmony, prevent destitution, and keep deserted
wives and families off the public dole.”50 Thus, just as Puritan religious leaders had argued for
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a promotion of equal punishment for sexual transgression in 17th century England, they also
espoused gender-equality in divorce petitioning. Divorce requests filed by women were heard
in Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay as early as the 1630’s, but comparable hearings would
not occur in England until 1857.51
Massachusetts and Connecticut as Puritan colonies both allowed for divorce a vinculo
and Massachusetts courts between 1639 and 1692, granted some 27 divorces.52 It was not until
1677, after divorces had been granted for over 22 years, that Connecticut finally quietly passed
a statute listing justifiable reasons for suit: adultery, fraudulent contract, willful desertion, or
seven years’ absence.53 The codification of this law translated into a greater freedom for colonial
women, the gender most likely to file for divorce. Indeed, the most common recipient of a
Connecticut divorce was the deserted wife. Men who wished to escape a spouse or children
without legal grounds for divorce would often vanish and possibly remarry in a new community.54
Even before the Connecticut Divorce Law was enacted in 1677, abandoned women brought
suit in order to throw off their coverture and the memory of their husband. Examples from
1660 and 1676 reveal much about the rulings of the Connecticut courts when deserted women
stood before the bar:
This Court orders that in case Sarah north hear not of her husband by that seventh year be
expired (he haveing bene absent six, already) that then she shal be free from her conjugal
bonds. (1660)
Upon the petition of Sarah Towle whoe hath been desrted by her husband above six years,
without any care or provision made for supply of her or her child’s maintenance by her
husband, this Court declares that in case the said Twole shall have opportunity to joyner
herself in marriage with another man, she is left at liberty soe to doe without offence to
the law or this Court. (1676)55
Divorce petitions reflect the presence of women within colonial jurisprudence. In
the inclusion of a female voice within New England courts and the promulgation of equitable,
gender neutral morality law, Puritan law can be seen as more inclusive than that of England.
The seventeenth century courtroom was community-focused and broad in its representation.
Its activities centered on “maintaining harmonious neighborly relations, ensuring equitable
local trading, and monitoring sexual and moral conduct,” all embraced the essentiality of the
female perspective. The presence of women as witnesses, plaintiffs, and defendants reflects the
informal role of women as “guardians of communal morality.”56 In opposition to the English
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jurisprudential tradition, women’s access to courts in Puritan New England was advanced by
the colonies’ prohibition against lawyers, their simple procedural rules, and the magistrates’
idea that God would guide their decisions.57 The Puritans adopted the English practice of
prosecuting moral lapses, yet they rejected ecclesiastical courts in favor of a layman judiciary over
a professionalized bar. The early abandonment of more formalistic constructs of English common
law thus allowed for a significant female presence in court. While women were not allowed to
be lawyers or judges, they were granted considerable credibility both in bringing petitions and
on the witness stand due to the Puritan ambition for achieving a “Godly-society.”
The Puritan’s attempt at equity stemmed from their belief that a God-fearing and pious
society required equal punishments for a comprehensive elimination of sin and vice. As Cornelia
Hughes Dayton says, Puritan judges in New Haven strove to enact a single gender neutral
standard for moral offenses due to their “strongly held belief that godly behavior should be the
measure for all inhabitants.”58 “Hence sinners, whether women or men, servants or wealthy
church members, could expect to be lectured from the bench to follow “the rule” of neighborly
kindness, to refrain from “wicked” “uncleanness,” or to emulate such familiar biblical figures as
“Micaell the Archangell.”59 Thus, as Dayton explains, women who brought charges of sexual
assault “had good reason to believe that their voices would not be ignored and that the men
elected to the bench would not reflexively use whatever skeptical views they harbored of women’s
nature to shield accused men from exposure and penalty.”60 After Mercy Payne explained “a
large relation” of her efforts to resist John Frost’s advances, the magistrates challenged Frost’s
denials saying “What temptation should shee bee under to bring sucha thing out to her owne
shame?”61 In cases such as this, and those concerning rape, domestic violence, and premarital
sex, the court openly accepted female testimony and severely punished the accused men. The
central Puritan dogma that the individual was to be obedient to God’s law ensured that men
would be punished for sinful behavior. While a double standard of sexual morality did develop,
de jure equality was a Puritan ambition and, as Dayton states, “policies that were intended to
create the most God-fearing society possible operated to reduce the near-absolute power that
English men by law wielded over their wives, to undercut men’s sense of sexual entitlement to
women’s bodies, and to relieve women in some situations from their extreme dependency on
men.”62
Thus the lay-judiciary, informal procedure, and the focus on morality prosecutions
allowed for a significant female presence within the early New England courtroom. The exclusion
of women from a fraternal-type jurisprudence was not a Puritan construct, but rather a product
of the increasing secularization of New England starting in the 18th century. While secularization
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has typically been thought of as a force for widening the legal status of women, it was this process
which effectively shelved the doctrine of moral equity and suppressed the female voice within
New England courts until women were relegated to a domestic sphere removed from easy access
to the legal realm.63 Secularization was fueled by the increasing religious diversity stemming from
an influx of Dutch, Scottish, German, and Quaker immigrants and the increasing dominance
of American-born Puritan generations. However, increasing colonial commercialization was
the central development leading toward secularization. New Englanders began to engage in
maritime trade, “thus introducing alien commercial elements into the Bible commonwealths.”64
As the 18th century dawned, colonial courts increasingly shifted in facilitation of the expanding
economy and the court’s constituency became limited to propertied men active in this blossoming
capitalism.65 While judges and lawmakers made no concerted effort to curtail the courtroom
presence of women, the rise of the professional bar and the increased adherence to English
common law and rules of evidence raised barriers which would prevent equal court access for
women.
As the court-room became increasingly defined as a male arena, the church began to
see a rise in female influence. The late 17th century declension was defined by a decrease in male
church membership due to a consuming focus on commercial opportunities.66 Contemporary
men understood that “the goals of religion-to create a godly society-often conflicted with the
goals of commerce,” and within this time period, “commerce usually won.”67 Fewer men in
the church resulted in a loss of clerical power over the community. The church was pushed to
the margins of political life just as women were beginning to wield increasing influence within
its confines. Thus, while the colonial legal system increasingly shifted away from moralistic
prosecutions in order to focus on commercial adjudication, the church began to make “the passive
female a symbol of Christian virtues, and associate men and manliness with the materialistic
and competitive world of trade.”68 Although passivity had always been a characteristic valued in
females, as evidenced by the prosecution of vocal dissidents like Ann Hutchinson, the association
of women with spirituality and men with secular concerns signaled a divergence from the Puritan
ideal of spiritual equality. Thus, the church was defining women as the protectors of spirituality
at the same time that the court was adopting common law principles facilitating the shift from
court-enforced social morality towards commercial law. In this way the concept of women as
moral arbiters hardened and worked in concert with the formalization of courtroom procedure
to virtually eliminate the female familiarity with colonial courts. As Laurel Thatcher Ulrich
explains in A Midwife’s Tale, “for most women, attending court was more than “inconvenient,
It was venture into an alien world.”69
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As men and women became encapsulated in narrowing and polarizing social roles, the
Puritan commitment to moral equity began to fade. Economics, trade, and an emerging sense
of privacy led to a decreased focus on the moral health of the community. The patriarchal legal
culture began to abandon the Puritan-style court confessions of moral crimes such as slander,
pre-marital sex, and drunkenness. The moral upkeep of the town elites, as was an early Puritan
ambition, was abandoned as American law came to mirror the common law. The middle class
was increasingly sheltered from public ignominy and punishment as the court began to target
impoverished and marginal women when prosecuting sexual deviancy. The legal shift away from
prosecutions of moral lapses in an increasingly male-dominated system “introduced skeptical
attitudes toward the reliability of women’s charges of male abuse.”70 This suspicion is evidenced
through contemporary newspapers and almanacs which demonstrated an increasing “toleration
of misogynist, anti-matrimonial, and bawdy themes,” previously censored by Puritan purists.
This environment not only prevented many women from participating in the legal culture,
but it also raised the burden of proof placed upon any woman to secure recompense for an
accusation she ventured to bring before the bar. Consequently, not only did divorces become
more difficult to obtain, but “the stricter the rules of evidence, the more difficult it was to win
a case that required juries to accept the word of a woman against the word of a man, unless he
happened to belong to a stigmatized group.”71 As Ulrich explores a rape case in A Midwife’s Tale
she discovers that they frequently became “a contest between the men involved, the husband or
father, the accused, the judges and jury rather a judgment of the events themselves.”72 Therefore,
in response to a rapidly commercializing society and an increasing secularism, within the 18th
century the “collective commitment to upholding a God-fearing society through the courts had
been abandoned and Puritan resistance to the technicalities of English common law practice
had faded,” and gender-specific spheres had hardened when “a new public life emerged from
which women were excluded.”73
The 18th century legal formalization and mirroring of common-law procedure within
New England not only increasingly isolated women from court, but it also “foreshadowed the
more explicit nineteenth-century ideology that reserved the public realms of commerce, law
and politics to men and gave white women moral dominion over privatized families.”74 Thus,
women’s legal subordination was augmented as Puritan jurisprudence was replaced in America.
While the Puritan prosecuted heretical females and retained a coverture policy in order to clearly
define women as the subordinate sex, their focus on Godly equality and maintaining moral
order translated into liberal divorce laws and a significant female presence within the colonial
courtroom. When Puritan law is viewed in this multidimensional manner, it can no longer be
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simplified in accordance with its traditional classification as America’s ultimate jurisprudential
repression of women. Indeed, as Cornelia Hughes Dayton concludes, “if Puritan approaches
to the law, such as simplifying civil procedure, punishing men and women equally, and
receiving women’s stories of abuse supportively had been retained as permanent fixtures of the
evolving American legal system, the result would have been a less patriarchal society in the long
run.”75
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“The Regiment Bore a Conspicuous Part”1:
A Brief History of the Eight Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
Gibraltar Brigade, Army of the Potomac


Brian Matthew Jordan
On April 10, 1850, a sixteen year-old from Xenia, Ohio named Samuel Sexton copied
a stanza of Epes Sargent’s poem, “A Life on the Ocean Wave,” into his notebook:
A life on the ocean wave! A home on the rolling deep!
Where the scattered waters rave, and the winds their revels keep!
Like an eagle caged I pine, on this dull unchanging shore.
Oh give me the flashing brine! The spray and the tempest roar!2
Before his death in New York City, July 11, 1896, Sexton would serve as the Assistant Surgeon
of the Eighth Ohio Volunteers, his entire service in the field so strenuous that he was obliged
to rest after the second year of combat.3 Arduously contending with the wounds and emotions
of the wounded and dying from Romney to Winchester, Fredericksburg to the Peninsula, and
South Mountain to Antietam, Sexton acquired an emotional connection to the regiment. This
would generate a lifelong correspondence with Lt. Col. Franklin Sawyer, who would command
the unit from May 1862 and pen its regimental history.4 The Civil War would metamorphose
Sexton’s mundane Ohio shore, the “flashing brine” of the trials of the Eighth his vessel.
The trials of the American nation had begun much earlier; exactly one week after
Sexton reproduced Sargent’s work, Vice-President Fillmore excoriated Missouri Senator Thomas
Benton on the floor of the Senate as the debates which would eventually frame the Compromise
of 1850 heated. The compromise would include the Fugitive Slave Act. This legislation was
greeted with a Northern acerbity that only increased the intensity of sectional strife. The
tortuous litany of key events to follow—the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Bleeding Kansas, Dred Scott,
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the fraudulent Lecompton Constitution, and John Brown’s raid—would for the South be sealed
by the election of Lincoln in 1860. This apparent loss for slaveholders in the balance of power
led South Carolina to take the lead in forming the Confederacy.
On the morning of April 12, 1861, a bloodless bombardment at Ft. Sumter in
Charleston Harbor effectively marked the commencement of hostilities. Three days later,
President Lincoln called for 75,000 militiamen to respond to the rebellion; Ohio demonstrated
no timidity in responding to Lincoln’s supplication. Between April 18 and April 29, 1861,
inspirational meetings were held and companies from across northern Ohio were coalesced
into a regiment for three months of service.5 “On the twenty-third, a rousing Union meeting
was held at Medina village,” wrote Lorenzo Vanderhoef, Company K. “I am now a Soldier!
The United States now claims my services. Who would have thought, two months ago, that
Lorenzo Vanderhoef would ever be a volunteer soldier[?] But such is the fact. The actions of
the people in the Southern portion of our Republic was of such a nature as to endanger the
existence of our present form of government.”6
On May 2, the regiment was transported to Camp Dennison near Columbus for
organizational purposes and the mundane, yet necessary drills.7 As these activities transformed
the enlistees into men, Vanderhoef ’s comrades shared his sentiments. Indeed, when it became
apparent that the “three months men” would be sent to the cynosure of war and orders mandated
the reorganization of the regiment into a three year unit, many continued their service. On
July 24, 1861, the Eighth was sworn in for three years service under Col. Herman S. DePuy.8
Only Company I was absent, to be reorganized before rejoining the unit in western Virginia
that September. Companies D and B were selected as the skirmishers of the regiment and were
ordered with their Enfields to occupy the left and right, respectively. The remaining companies
were issued smoothbores.9
Drill and discipline continued until the regiment was “loaded into boxcars” to
participate in McClellan’s initial campaigns in western Virginia.10 McClellan had been urged
by Ohio Governor Dennison to cross into western Virginia, support the Unionists, and prevent
the Rebel seizure of rail communication lines. Though initially sluggish, McClellan drove the
enemy back from Philippi; subsequently, Brig. Gen. William Rosecrans attacked and affected the
withdrawal of the Confederates on Rich Mountain July 11, making Confederate Gen. Robert
S. Garnett’s position on Laurel Mountain indefensible. Garnett retreated, stumbling into a
delaying action at Corrick’s Ford, where he became the first general added to the casualty rolls
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of the Civil War. Garnett’s force continued a northeastward exodus; Brig. Gen. C.W. Hill’s
brigade of the Army of Occupation, which included the Eighth, pursued for about five miles
and snared a few stragglers.11 However, Hill’s prudent pursuit was ended with what Sawyer
described as “a farce of the first water”: a war “council” eschewing the demoralized condition
of the enemy and the sufficient number of fresh troops available.12 Even the overly cautious
McClellan chastised Hill, who was censured and relieved.13
Marching continued in western Virginia, and the regiment was ordered to guard
portions of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad throughout the winter. This routine task was made
notable with a severe outbreak of typhoid fever contracted at a camp thereafter referred to as
“Maggotty Hollow.”14 Along with the marching and bivouacking, skirmishing occurred at
Worthington, Hanging Rock, Romney, and Blue’s Gap without much consequence.15 One
bizarre incident occurred December 21, though, when two members of the regiment were playing
cards and began quarreling. One withdrew his pistol, shot his comrade, and completed the
heinous act by ramming a bayonet through the dying man’s neck. The murderer was apparently
never convicted.16
On March 1, 1862, the Eighth shifted to Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, where
it was brigaded with the Fourth Ohio, Sixty-Seventh Ohio, Fourteenth Indiana, and Seventh
Virginia (Union) and placed under the command of Col. Nathan Kimball in Gen. Shields’
division. Save the Sixty-Seventh Ohio, these units would remain together for the duration of
the war.17 This transfer to the Shenandoah was a part of a new stratagem to mass men in the
Valley, with two Union forces—one under the command of General Nathaniel Banks, which
included Shields’ division, and one under the command of General Charles Fremont— driving
“Stonewall” Jackson’s outnumbered forces south.
Consigned to defeating the federals one element at a time, Jackson attacked what he
believed to be the rear guard of Banks’ men at Kernstown on March 23, 1862. Instead, Jackson
backed into Shields’ entire division, commanded by Col. Kimball after Shields was seriously
wounded on March 22. What ensued was a handsome federal victory that turned Jackson’s left
flank and sent him reeling into retreat. The Eighth performed ably in their first real engagement,
taking some forty-six casualties. Sawyer recalled:
“Cannon balls were crashing through the trees . . . whizzing fearfully close to use.
We were ordered to charge at once . . . The fire from both sides was intense, our men
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fell rapidly, but gallantly held their places, loading rapidly and firing with unerring
certainty, as the dead in our front plainly showed.”18
After the war, as “Stonewall” Jackson acquired his mystique and popularity, the federal veterans
of Kernstown would write about the engagement with flourish and added significance. “Who has
not heard of the first battle of Winchester [Kernstown]?” Brevet Maj. Gen. Alvin C. Voris asked.
“This was the greatest battle of the late war.”19 Anniversary ceremonies and commemorations
of the battle held in subsequent years probably spoke more to the sentimentality of their baptism
of fire and heavy losses than to any true significance, for the battle only forced a continued
federal presence in the Shenandoah and near Fredericksburg that would prevent men from
joining McClellan’s operations to the east.
Thomas Galwey, Company B, returned to the regiment in April, having visited
Columbus briefly on recruitment duty.20 He visited the Kernstown battlefield before setting
out with the regiment in search of “Stonewall” Jackson. “[He] is moving somewhere all the
time, as lively as a flea,” Galwey remembered.21 The same could not be said of the federals.
The Eighth became bogged down on perfunctory roads, exacerbated by the incessant rains;
furthermore, they were lacking tents, provisions, and shoes. “We look like a pack of thieving
vagabonds—no crowns in our hats, no soles to our shoes, no seats to our pantaloons.”22 By
May, provisions finally arrived, and on May 12, the men of the Eighth broke their camp en route
to Fredericksburg, where they would join with Gen. Irvin McDowell’s force on May 22.23
At Falmouth on May 23, the division was received by Lincoln and Secretary of War
Stanton; however, their stay in Fredericksburg was short-lived. The division was ordered
back to the Shenandoah after it was learned that Jackson had driven Banks from the Valley.
Crossing the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, the disheartening return to the Valley
was made; Shields’ division descended on Front Royal June 1. “We surprised Col. O’Connor
and his Confederate force at Front Royal, capturing about three hundred prisoners and a
considerable amount of ammunition and stores,” Galwey reported. The most notable capture,
however, was the infamous Confederate spy Belle Boyd. “She is rather handsome and has some
accomplishments although their luster is somewhat heightened by her rather romantic career,”
he commented.24
Despite these achievements, all was not halcyon in the Valley for the federals. Jackson’s
twin victories at Cross Keys and Port Republic expelled the federals from the Valley and freed his
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men to adhere to Lee’s troops outside of Richmond.25 Thus in late June, Kimball’s men were
detached from Shields’ division and ordered to join McClellan on the Peninsula between the
York and the James Rivers. The men arrived the day following the Battle of Malvern Hill, the
last of the humiliating Seven Days’ Battles in which Lee had forced McClellan into stagnation at
Harrison’s Landing. In a torrential rain against the backdrop of Berkeley, birthplace of William
Harrison, the men of the Eighth arrived and united with the Army of the Potomac. Kimball’s
brigade was assigned to “Baldy” Smith’s division in the Second Corps.26
The men of the Eighth bowled over the new body to which they belonged. “If ever an
army had occasion to be proud of its organization, it is the Army of the Potomac,” wrote one
member of the regiment in a letter published in the Cincinnati Commercial.27 Not only was
the Eighth impressed with the discipline, morale, and élan consigned to them with their entry
into the Army of the Potomac, they noticed the disparity in supplies, rations, and thus health.
“This army has everything it wants. Fresh tomatoes are brought from Bermuda [Hundred];
new potatoes and onions are plenty. Health is improving.”28 The army lingered at Harrison’s
Landing until August 16, when Sumner’s Second Corps formed the rear guard of the army
as it moved northward to merge with Pope’s men. “Our march was most fatiguing,” Sawyer
recalled.29 At Newport News, the march halted as the federals embarked on steamers bound
for Aquia Creek, where another vessel would float them into Alexandria.30
Forming the rear guard, it took the Second Corps several days to coalesce into their
new camp near Washington. In the process, the men of the Eighth heard the din of cannon
in the vicinity of Manassas Junction, where a didactic battle had been fought in July 1861.
Suddenly, “without explanation,” the Second Corps was issued ammunition and ordered to
cover the road to Centreville. “On every hand was the confusion of a defeated and retreating
army,” Sawyer wrote.31 Only instead of Lee’s army, it was Pope’s Army of Virginia making the
retreat. The withdrawal was covered and the federals slithered into Washington with little time
to collect thoughts and reorganize. Lee, in one of his boldest machinations of the war, would
thrust his army northward into Maryland, aiming to affect war-weary Northern civilians and
foreign observers to intervene on behalf of the Confederacy in a mission that would relieve
Virginia of war’s toils and garner much-needed supplies and rations.
The news having arrived that Lee’s forces had commenced crossing the Potomac on
September 4, the Eighth soon marched out of Rockville and into the Maryland countryside
to check the invasion.32 On September 13, outside of Frederick, a stray copy of Lee’s Special
Orders No. 191 was discovered and forwarded to McClellan, who promised to “whip Bobbie
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Lee.” The Rebel army was dangerously divided, six of its nine divisions engaged in an attempt
to capture Harpers Ferry. The next day, September 14, proved to be a disaster for the Army
of Northern Virginia with the first battle of the campaign. “Heavy cannonading was heard to
the front,” Sawyer remembered of South Mountain. “The roar of artillery in front was almost
constant, and occasionally the dull, heavy swell of musketry could be distinctly heard.”33 The
Eighth was growing impatient and soon came up as a supporting line, though accomplishing
little more than keen observation. As dusk suffocated the “severe” battle, all reflected on a scene
“beyond description.”34
For the Eighth, the horror of South Mountain was only a harbinger of Antietam’s
miseries. “We formed our line of battle by daylight, and went to the front, fording Antieta[m]
Creek, waist deep, and then charging up the hill for the enemy who were posted in strong force
on the undulating ridges for a long way both to our right and left,” Daniel Daggett of Company
D wrote home.35 French’s division formed the center of the Union battle line; the “gallant
troops pressed eagerly forward” into the Roulette orchard. Here, Kimball’s brigade, consisting
of the Fourteenth Indiana, Eighth Ohio, 132nd Pennsylvania, and Seventh Virginia (Union),
were held in reserve until “tremendous volleys” from the Rebels ensconced in the Sunken Road
threatened to overrun the federal lines. Kimball ordered up his brigade, and with an emphatic
“Forward, Eighth Ohio!” the men moved up to face “a most savage fire of musketry, grape and
canister” for nearly four hours.36
General Israel Richardson, commanding a Second Corps division, had advanced to
the left of French’s position to further secure the flank. Meanwhile, the right flank had been
“abandoned,” and the Rebels made a flanking attempt, which was repulsed heroically by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Indiana as they changed fronts and charged under fire. “We maintained
the fight with cartridges taken from the boxes of the dead and wounded,” Daggett noted.37 For
Kimball, this maneuver, executed “as veterans and as only brave men could,” had salvaged the
right.38 But it was a bloody salvage: of 324 engaged, 165 were killed, wounded, or captured;
three companies were left without officers, and seventeen balls passed through the regimental
colors.39 Lorenzo Vanderhoef, who in 1861 had been so proud to finally be a soldier, was
wounded in four places and began his journey through a litany of the general hospitals established
in Frederick.40 For the nation, the gruesome realities of South Mountain and Antietam both
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repelled Lee’s invasion and proffered the opportune moment for Lincoln to march forward
with emancipation; for the Eighth, it offered a heroic moment to be memorialized in the
moniker subsequently consigned to its brigade: the Gibraltar Brigade.41 Galwey consummated
summarized their Antietam experience: “What would have been the result if Kimball’s men had
not fought gallantly all the forenoon?”42

On September 22, the Second Corps moved to Bolivar Heights, where it would remain
until late October. “You have read of this place being surrendered to that traitor Miles,” Sexton
recorded in his diary from the unit’s new position, from which they would depart for Falmouth,
across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg, Virginia.43 By the time the Eighth reached
Falmouth, the Army of the Potomac had a new commander. The prudence and politically
induced views which constricted the war aims of McClellan finally did enough to effect his
replacement by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside. “The greatest dissatisfaction prevails everywhere
in consequence,” Galwey wrote, although he noted that next to McClellan, Burnside was the
best liked man in the army.44
For nearly a month—a month in which the men anticipated a movement on
Fredericksburg— all that separated the federal army and its Rebel counterpart was the narrow
valley formed by the Rappahannock River, allowing for such verbal interactions as this one:
Secesh to an Ohio picket - “What regiment do you belong to?”
Buckeye - “8th Ohio.”
Secesh - “What state are you from?”
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Buckeye - “Ohio! Where else did you think, you darned fool?”
Secesh - “You came here by way of Bull Run, didn’t you?”
Buckeye - “No, by Antietam!”45
Apparently, mention of Antietam was enough to dissolve the exchange. And soon, for the Eighth,
mention of Fredericksburg would have a similar effect. On December 12, the pontoon bridges
that Burnside had ordered for a swift crossing of the river finally arrived after administrative
failure and miscommunication. The next day, the battle opened with the Eighth forming on
the right in Sumner’s Grand Division. The regiment moved up Hanover Street with the First
Delaware and Fourth Ohio to the left as skirmishers for French’s division, meeting intense fire
from Barksdale’s Mississippians before clearing them out and garnering control of the surrounding
buildings.46 Summarily, the column was ordered forward at a double-quick to a line at the base
of the Mayre’s Heights. This frontal assault across an open killing ground was devastating for
the Eighth; by 4 o’clock, they were out of ammunition. As Sawyer recollected:
During the entire day we were subjected to a most murderous fire of both artillery
and small-arms, which swept our position, and the whole interval from our line to
the town of Fredericksburg. Our line was too weak to advance further upon the
enemy’s works, and our position was not passed by any troops up to the time of
our withdrawal.47
Hour after hour of futility produced forty-four killed and wounded and a devastating, one-sided
defeat for the Army of the Potomac. After the subsequent, humiliating “Mud March,” the army
would be led not by Burnside, but by Joseph Hooker.48
With Hooker came noticeable improvements in morale, espirit de corps, and
sanitation. “Our army has not moved, that is, in a physical sense, but I think it is observable
that a vast improvement has been going forward,” Sawyer wrote to Samuel Sexton from camp
near Falmouth.49 All expected an active campaign, which commenced on April 28, 1863,
when the army crossed the Rappahannock; French’s division assumed a position near the
Chancellorsville crossroads in the haunting undergrowth known as “the Wilderness” at right
angles to the main federal line. A fierce battle raged there the first three days of May, of which
the most salient feature was Jackson’s march against the federal left, smashing the federal XI
Corps and earning another stunning victory for Lee. The Eighth played merely an observatory
role in the battle, losing two men. Still, Sawyer understood that it was “quite unlike the three
great battles” he participated in previously; it was rather “a series of desperate efforts, by each
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army to secure different points and positions . . . . the battle was rather heard than seen [due
to the undergrowth].”50
At 11 o’clock May 5, the Eighth fell into the long line of retreat back to Falmouth,
where it remained until mid-June, when the news of yet another northern invasion by Lee was
received.51 As the blue lines slithered north in response, Hooker was deposed and replaced by
Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade on June 28. Three days later, marching along the Taneytown
Road, the Second Corps was drawn into the unassuming borough of Gettysburg, where west
of town, a meeting engagement had escalated into a pitched fight. “Towards noon we became
sensible of the battle from the roar of artillery and the grim clouds of dust and smoke that
gathered gloomily,” Sawyer recalled.52 Excitement grew as news disseminated; the Eighth
anxiously awaited orders, which would come that evening from Maj. Gen. Hancock. He ordered
the regiment to sleep on arms a mile to the rear of Cemetery Ridge line. Reveille sounded at
4 am July 2 and the regiment moved up to an orchard west of Taneytown Road near Ziegler’s
Grove.53 “For several hours everything seemed unusually quiet,” Sawyer recollected. This ended
with clangor and commotion in the direction of Sickles’ notorious salient. At 4 o’clock, as the
battle raged back and forth to the south, Sawyer was ordered to take the Eighth’s 209 men and
clear out Rebel skirmishers lodged on the Emmitsburg Road. They charged across the road,
drove out the skirmishers, and established their own skirmish line about 250 yards west of the
Emmitsburg Road having “awoken the Johnnies.”54 As darkness draped the battlefield, guns
slowly grew silent and the unit was ordered to maintain their position along the Emmitsburg
Road “to the last,” though no assistance could be provided.55 For twenty-six precarious hours,
the Eighth gave new birth to its brigade epithet. Skirmish fire continued sporadically, but
between 7 o’clock and 8 o’clock July 3, it became “murderous.” Galwey recalled that the fire
the Eighth directed at the enemy skirmishers became “scientific”; as soon as a puff of smoke
rose in their front, they would immediately aim and fire.56
The enemy’s intensity grew along the extent of the line, climaxing in the symphony of
the “terrific cannonade” about 1 o’clock. Artillery shells of both armies whizzed over their heads;
“for more than an hour,” the Eighth was literally detained in a forlorn position in the “horrid
storm” of Pickett’s Charge.57 Despite its advanced position, unsupported but for Woodruff ’s
Battery in Ziegler’s Grove, the Eighth “sprang” to its feet and deployed into column as the
cannonade waned and the Rebel infantry advance commenced. Pettigrew and Trimble’s men
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“advanced splendidly,” appearing as if they would overrun the Eighth’s position.58 But they
received a lashing: the Eighth charged the Rebels, many prisoners either falling back or throwing
down their arms. Furthermore, in a consummately executed maneuver, the Eighth changed its
front and executed a left wheel while firing, pouring lead into the left flank of Brig. Gen. Joseph
R. Davis’ brigade from behind a weathered fencerow.59 On the Confederate left that afternoon,
there would be three other left flanking movements. The 136th New York, to the right of the
Eighth, and the 125th and 126th New York to its left would anchor the envelopment of Davis’
brigade, metamorphosing the “distinct, graceful” Rebel lines into an amorphous mass.60 The
Eighth collected the colors of three regiments and captured some 300 prisoners, suffering nearly
50 percent casualties. Yet the victory was complete, Lee whipped, and the invasion repelled.61
The Eighth had played “a most conspicuous part” in the late, great battle, and the men were
not only “greeted with rousing cheers” by their comrades, but extensive press coverage citing
Sgt. John Miller, who would be awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions that
day.62
The Eighth passed several weeks in Meade’s cautious pursuit of Lee until orders were
received on August 15 to proceed to New York City to quell the draft riots; however, by the time
they arrived, the riots had been contained. Likewise, the Eighth simply enjoyed a “continued
ovation.”63 For Edward Dickinson, Company B, this ovation ended in charges of intoxication
and indecent exposure.64
The Eighth returned to the field at Culpepper, seeing negligible pieces of the battles
at Bristoe Station, Locust Grove, Mine Run, and Morton’s Ford.65 Perhaps the most exciting
event of autumn 1863 for the men was the Ohio gubernatorial election between Republican
John Brough and the Copperhead leader Clement Laird Vallandigham. “It afforded me the
greatest amount of pleasure to get the glorious news of the election,” Sawyer wrote to Sexton
upon learning of Brough’s victory, noting so much had been done to “rebuke treason and traitors
at home.”66 The Eighth cast 191 votes in the election, only one vote for Vallandigham.67 It
seemed a propitious harbinger for Lincoln’s reelection the next year.
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With 1864 came reorganization, a new general-in-chief, and his stratagem of four
federal thrusts to gradually furl the Confederacy into submission. One of those thrusts, an
overland campaign against the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond, was inaugurated in
the Wilderness region the veterans of Chancellorsville knew so well. On May 5, the Eighth,
along with the Seventh West Virginia, was ordered to advance up the Orange Plank Road to
recapture several guns lost to the enemy by Brig. Gen. George Getty’s division of the VI Corps.
With the Eighth on the south side of the Orange Plank, it was “spiritedly done” and cited in
Hancock’s official report of the battle.68 “Our clothes were literally torn to shreds,” Galwey
recorded of the peregrination through the underbrush.69
With replenished haversacks, the men arose at 4 o’clock am May 6, moving rapidly
through the woods before falling almost entirely into the “embrace” of Longstreet’s flank attack.
With Col. John Coons of the Fourteenth Indiana in command, his unit and the Eighth, with
no visibility, were “fiercely attacked.”70 The Eighth suffered heavily, with eighteen men killed
and wounded and two sent to Andersonville; however, the Rebel loss was just as burdensome,
and the battle ended in stalemate.71 Nevertheless, Grant would not retreat like his predecessors
might have. Skirmishing continued the next three days as the federals turned south along the
Brock Road in a race to Spotsylvania Courthouse.
Lee won the race to that sleepy crossroads, but nobody would win in the ensuing
bedlam. The first of two major attacks launched on the Rebel works occurred May 10. At 5pm,
the Second and Sixth Corps “struggled stubbornly through the woods . . . only to meet a terrible
repulse,” an operation in which the Eighth suffered casualties of one killed, 23 wounded.72
But just after 5am May 12 came the major attack, led by Hancock’s Second Corps. Sawyer led
the First Delaware and the Eighth with orders to drive troops on their left before uniting with
the balance of Carroll’s brigade, at which time they would oblique to the right and attack the
enemy trenches.73 Unknowingly, the Eighth had entered one of the most savage fights of the
war. As Galwey wrote:
Nothing can describe the confusion, the savage bloodcurdling yells, the murderous
faces, the awful curses, superhuman hardihood, and the grisly horror of the melee!
Of all the battles I took part in, Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania exceeded all the rest
in stubbornness, ferocity, and in carnage.74
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All regimental commanders in the Eighth’s division were wounded, including their beloved
Sawyer, who was struck in the left arm by an enemy ball.75 Carroll was wounded on both May
12 and 13; he was promoted to brigadier general, but unfit for field command, his brigade was
assumed by Col. Thomas Smyth.76
Still, the campaign continued as the federals kept maneuvering towards Richmond,
making bloody sojourns along the North Anna, Pamunkey, and Totopotomoy before once again
confronting Lee’s army June 1-3 at Cold Harbor.77 The Eighth was merely involved in heavy
skirmishing on the first. The next day, with shortages and exhaustion pervading the army,
Grant delayed Meade’s intended attack, proffering Lee an entire day to bolster his defenses and
establish a killing ground. The federal assault finally began around 4:30am June 3. Smyth’s
brigade extended the federal lines south from the left of Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler’s division,
the right of which met the Cold Harbor Road.78 Smyth stepped off with Tyler’s division; Owen
and McKeen’s brigades were in reserve. Summarily, sharp skirmishing opened into a murderous
fire from the Seventeenth, Forty-Second, and Sixty-Sixth North Carolina of Martin’s Brigade
(Hoke’s Division). The Eighth, moving forward with the Fourteenth Connecticut to its right and
the Fourth Ohio to its left, came within sixty yards of the enemy lines, but with thin ranks, the
enemy position was “impregnable.”79 Thus ended what Sawyer dubbed a “sanguinary action”
that snuffed out the lives of over 13,000 federals; Smyth’s brigade had contributed some 170
to that total.80 The macabre overland campaign had come to an end;81 maneuvering and an
impeccable pontoon bridge would not only transport the federal army across the James to the
vital rail junction of Petersburg, but transport it to nearly ten months of siege.
In the trenches opposing the city on June 25, 1864, the Eighth’s term of service having
expired, the unit was ordered to Columbus to muster out; however, there was comparatively
little cheering. “Where would we find civilian friends to compare with soldier comrades?”
questioned Galwey.82 Indeed, the sight of the Ohio River affected mixed emotions.83 And
then it was over as quickly as it began. Mayor Senter, brass bands, citizens, veterans, and a
banner greeted the Seventh and Eighth regiments in Columbus. The regimental colors were
forwarded to Governor Brough, who responded:
The record of the Eighth Regiment is among the most brilliant of those made
during the war. … Upon every field they have fought, and every contest in which
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they have been engaged, the officers and men of the command have displayed
earnest zeal, courage and patriotic fidelity to the country.84
The Eighth had enlisted 993 members, had witnessed the death in battle of 124, had lost 72
to disease, and had discharged 340 for wounds.85 It marched over 2,260 miles, traveled nearly
as much by rail and steamer, and participated in 76 battles and skirmishes.86 After Antietam,
its brigade was christened the “Gibraltar Brigade”; after Gettysburg, it became the “Bloody
Eighth.” But statistics and reputations and epithets aside, it was the comradeship fostered
in the regiment that was most important to many. Letters exchanged, reunion meetings
held, encomiums delivered, and monuments dedicated would attest to regimental pride. On
September 14, 1887, “Ohio’s Day” at Gettysburg, thirty-seven survivors of the Eighth and their
families came to dedicate a regimental monument along Emmitsburg Road, commemorating
those sons “who gave their lives and best energies to their country.”87 Gradually, those surviving
sons became scarcer, and with their deaths, the stories of their exploits became consigned to
archival containers and impersonal publications.
Assistant Surgeon Sexton, who after the war would attain international recognition for his
treatment of ear diseases, had come full circle from his childhood poetry recitations.88 Oh, had
he and the Eighth found the flashing brine! And my, did the spray and the tempest roar!
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“the desired effect”: pontiac’s rebellion and the
native american struggle to survive in britain’s
north american conquest


Joseph D. Gasparro
Ravaged by war and in debt after its victory in the French and Indian War, Britain
was not only recuperating, but rejoicing over the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763.1 This
treaty officially ended the fighting and gave Britain all of the land east of the Mississippi River,
formerly owned by the French. The ink on the treaty was barely dry when a new insurgence
arose in British occupied North America. Native Americans, dissatisfied after the war with their
position as conquered people and not as allies, rebelled collectively against British colonists and
forts along the frontier. Before the war had started, the French had traded and lived among the
Native Americans, but perhaps most importantly, they had given them presents to show respect
and diplomacy. The Native Americans had grown accustomed to this act of friendliness and when
Britain, in debt after the war, wanted to considerably reduce the number of gifts given, there
were severe consequences. In 1763, the Native Americans led an insurgence, commonly called
Pontiac’s Rebellion because of Pontiac, the Ottawa leader. This insurgence would culminate in
the first extensive multi-tribal resistance to European colonization in America.2 In response to
Britain’s new policies, the Native Americans took ten of their forts, which led not only to excess
in conflict, but to the British exposing smallpox blankets onto the Native Americans.
The term ‘frontier’ will take on two meanings in this paper. A frontier in this paper
will be regarded as an uninhabited region, one that has lacked major exploration and study.
Because of the absence of examination and official colonization, a frontier will also be viewed
as “geographic zones of interaction between two or more distinctive cultures.”3 At the time
of Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British considered the Native Americans as savages and themselves
civilized, a view echoed by Fredrick Jackson Turner, who felt a frontier was “the meeting place
between savagery and civilization.”4 The term ‘Native American’ is used frequently throughout
this paper, and while the word is vague in identifying certain tribes, the frontier was also vague,
as aspects of it were oftentimes indistinguishable and unclear due to its vastness (see Figure 1).
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During any given ambush or attack, numerous tribes would come and go as they saw fit, and
oftentimes several members of a tribe felt uncomfortable with warfare. Relations between the
Native Americans and British were also not uniform. There have been many accounts of Native
Americans warning frontier settlers prior to an attack and even aiding in their actual escape.5
Similarly, British surgeons stationed at forts often provided medical care for the local Native
Americans.6 The frontier was a “vast wilderness, interspersed with lakes and mountains,” and
this not only impeded communication but access to reinforcements as well.7

				

				

Figure 18

In Fredrick Jackson Turner’s Frontier Thesis, published in 1893, he claimed that “[the]
idealistic conception of vacant lands as an opportunity for a new order of things is unmistakably
present” and that “never again will such gifts [such as] free land offer themselves.”9 The land
Turner claimed to be vacant and “free” was actually the home of numerous Native American
tribes. After the British victory in the French and Indian War, the British struggled to control
the Native Americans who had already adjusted to French policy, with whom they had lived and
traded more or less as equals.10 Richard White, who published The Middle Ground, described
this situation as the “middle ground,” a way of finding a common ground and cooperating.11
It is very likely that the British could have found a “middle ground” if they had kept the same
policy as the French, especially in respect to gift gifting, which the Native Americans took
as a sign of diplomacy. Furthermore, Turner calls North America’s Indian policy “a series of
experimentations,” and with good reason.12 Britain’s policy towards Native Americans, while
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constructed to help England’s economy, also helped to provoke Pontiac’s Rebellion. Faced with
Britain’s strict new policy, the Native Americans now struggled to alter their conceptions of
European colonization and comprehend the policies of the victor.
Since Francis Parkman published The Conspiracy of Pontiac in 1851, there have been two
major arguments on the subject of Pontiac’s Rebellion. One of the crucial arguments questions
how much power the Ottawa leader Pontiac truly had. Parkman’s work portrayed Pontiac as the
primary leader of the tribes and admiringly said his “authority was almost despotic.”13 Parkman
even called the uprising Pontiac’s own conspiracy. Other historians disputed Parkman’s views
and considered Pontiac’s authority to be more akin to a local commander than a great chief.
These historians even renamed the rebellion in order to avoid mentioning his name.14
Although debated for decades, Pontiac was indeed the true mastermind behind the
insurgence. While an initial insurgence plot among the Native Americans failed in 1761, Pontiac
was a more able leader and used the plans of that spoiled plot as a pattern for his assault upon
the British forces.15 Years later in 1766, when it came time for peace talk, the British sought
after Pontiac because they knew no lasting peace was possible without his approval.16 Historians
also questioned the effect of the infamous smallpox blankets on the Native American uprising.
Even though both men lack creditable evidence, Parkman, and Francis Jennings in 1988, agreed
that the blankets had a major impact on the tide of the war.17 Contrastingly, in 2005, David
Dixon rightfully belittled the consequences with exemplary statistics.18 Although there have been
numerous publications on Pontiac’s Rebellion, no author has had the viewpoint that the British
were influenced to distribute the blankets because of the Native American’s victories. Rather, these
historians conclude that the blankets were distributed either for selfish reasons or out of genuine
kindness.19 The idea, however, that the fall of the ten forts directly led to the distribution of
the smallpox blankets has never been explored by historians in the past. Nevertheless, as views
and sources have emerged and transformed over time concerning Pontiac’s Rebellion, so too
has the iconographic power of Pontiac and the success of the infamous blankets.
While Parkman, in a flattering language, justified Pontiac as the “Indians’ forlorn
hope” and the only leader of the rebellion, later historians not only added more leaders to the
insurgence but belittled Pontiac’s stature.20 When C. Hale Sipe published The Indian Wars of
Pennsylvania in 1929, he had nearly eighty years of scholarly research, of which Parkman never
had had the chance to use. In this work, Sipe included other Native Americans besides Pontiac
who helped in the insurgence.21 In 1947, when Howard H. Peckham published Pontiac and the
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Indian Uprising, he was the curator of manuscripts at William L. Clements Library, and learned
from the Thomas Gage Papers, delivered to him in 1937, that Parkman’s heroic Pontiac was
but a local commander who “had fought a losing war.”22 Peckham had the pleasure to view the
papers of Thomas Gage, who succeeded the arrogant Jeffery Amherst as British Commanderin-Chief of North America in 1763. These papers of Gage were full of “crucial and previously
inaccessible information on Pontiac and the ill-fated rebellion.”23 Written during the time of
World War II, Peckham does give Pontiac the credit he is due, but in a much more humble
light than the prodigious Pontiac of Parkman.24
As time went on, historians were motivated not only by other publications, but by
historical revisionism, or a reexamination of the facts. In 1972, Wilbur R. Jacobs published
Dispossessing the American Indian, in which he stood behind Parkman and asserted Pontiac as the
mastermind.25 Jacobs was heavily influenced by Vine Deloria, who in 1969 wrote Custer Died
for Your Sins: An Indian Manifest, in which Deloria felt Native Americans were being labeled as
malicious savages. Deloria wanted to break the stereotype and illustrate the atrocious history
of American expansionism into the west.26 The publications of Richard White’s The Middle
Ground in 1991 and William R. Nester’s Haughty Conquerors in 2000 established innovative
views on the story of Pontiac due in part to the historical revisionism that emerged towards
the end of the twentieth century.27 White follows Peckham’s view that Pontiac was only a local
commander, but adds that after the uprising was subdued with the signing of a peace treaty,
Native Americans’ reception of frequent presents resumed again, lands were protected by the
new proclamation of their British “father,” and the so called ‘middle ground’ was restored.28
Nester, on the other hand, was motivated by a reexamination of the documented facts and
blamed Amherst’s supercilious attitude and inability to listen to his British officers about his
new policy, which concerned the Native Americans’ revolt. Pontiac, Nester asserts, “was but
one of many chiefs who took up the Seneca war cry” that was provoked by Amherst’s “penny
wise, pound foolish” gift giving policy to the Native Americans.29
Aside from the debate over Pontiac’s power, evidence that suggests the outcome of the
infamous smallpox blankets at Fort Pitt in 1763 raises much discussion, as well as examination
of which British officer should take credit for the idea. When Parkman published his renowned
book in 1897, he cited two letters between Bouquet and Amherst in early July in which they
discuss dispersing smallpox among the Native Americans.30 The letters, however, were written
two weeks after Captain Simeon Ecuyer had apparently already given the infected blankets to
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two Native American chiefs. Generals Jeffery Amherst and Henry Bouquet, who were both
important and well-known British officers, also embodied the same qualities of leadership that
Parkman admired in Pontiac. Captain Ecuyer, who historians affirm gave the Native Americans
the blankets, conversely had neither the stature nor the popularity of Amherst or Bouquet.31
Parkman would thus not credit Ecuyer, merely a captain and subordinate to Bouquet, for the
distribution of the smallpox blankets.
Parkman, who died in 1893, asserted that the smallpox from the blankets wreaked
havoc on the frontier. Although Parkman lacked any statistical data, his theory would last
among historians until 1954, when Bernhard Knollenberg’s article “General Amherst and Germ
Warfare” argued the contrary.32 The use of the term ‘germ warfare’ to describe the incident
at Fort Pitt appeared among a generation which had just witnessed the largest armed conflict
in world history—the dropping of the atomic bombs. Knollenberg, who, like Peckham, had
the advantage of using the Thomas Gage Papers, stated that smallpox did impact the Native
Americans, but it was not from the blankets. With the exception of Francis Jennings’s Empire
of Fortune in 1988, historians since Knollenberg’s article argue that the blankets did not spread
smallpox to the surrounding Native American tribes; rather, the tribes became infected by
smallpox while ravaging villages where the disease was prevalent.33 Before Pontiac or smallpox
infected blankets even entered into the minds of the British, they were concerned with attaining
land in the Ohio River Valley over the French. This is where Native American unrest first began
to form.
The French and Indian War began as a struggle for British expansion west of the
Allegheny Mountains in the Ohio River Valley. Prior to the war, three primary Native American
tribes lived in the area: the Seneca, the Delaware, and the Shawnee. While their economy was
self-sufficient and revolved around fishing and hunting, they had no great attachment to the
French, unlike the tribes of the Great Lakes region: the Ottawa, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and
Hurons. These nations traded, lived, and intermarried with the French. France’s three newly
acquired colonies, Canada, the Illinois Country, and Louisiana, were also extremely dependent
upon these Native Americans because their economic system was based upon a close trade
relationship. In the late 1740s, both the French and the British laid claim to the land in the
Ohio River Valley. Even though neither had settlers in the valley yet, the British needed an outlet
for their booming population and the French wanted to protect their economy and authority
over the land.34
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There, Ohio River Indians eventually began to trade with the British for provisions
such as alcohol. This enraged the French, who did not want to lose their economic monopoly.
Aside from hanging plaques on trees by every major river confluence in order to show claim to
the land, the French established forts in 1752 under Marquis Duquesne, Governor of Canada,
“to make every possible effort to drive the English from our lands.”35 While constructing the
forts, the French were dismayed when they were warned by Native Americans to “not build
any forts,” and to find out the British eventually set up their own fort a year later.36 When the
French received word of the building of the British garrison, they sent numerous troops who
successfully surrendered the fort. A year later, in 1754, the British ordered a then unremarkable
George Washington to help with the construction of their fort. When Washington realized the
fort was under French rule, he attacked a French militia a few miles from the fort, and with
that he “set the world on fire.”37 The French and Indian War had begun.
Seven years of conflict and war would follow the Battle of Jumonville Glen,
Washington’s attack on the French. Although Native Americans sided with the British before
the war with the exception of the Iroquois Confederacy, once the conflict began they primarily
fought alongside the French. Once the British began to build trading posts and an eventual
fort in the Ohio Region, the French not only began to attack British soldiers but their Native
American allies, made up mostly of the Iroqouis Confederacy. After unsuccessful attempts to
try to obtain weapons from the British in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Winchester, Virginia
in order to protect themselves, the Native Americans had no choice but to align themselves
with the French. Furthermore, the events leading up to the Battle of Jumonville Glen proved
to be particularly important. From the onset, the French had a more personal relationship with
the Native Americans, intermarried and even lived among them. Early in the war, in 1758, the
British signed the Treaty of Easton, stating that they would not settle west of the Allegheny
Mountains as long as the Ohio Nation did not side with the French.38 While the agreement was
followed at first by the Native Americans, they eventually disregarded it because their intimacy
with the French was stronger.
The war ended with the Treaty of Paris in February 1763, which gave the British all of
France’s land east of the Mississippi River. As a result, the French no longer possessed territory
in North America. With the French driven out, settlers began to move over the Allegheny
Mountains with the motivation to not only advance, but to profit from the fur trade. Not
only were the Native Americans angered by the defiance of the Treaty of Easton, but they were
stunned to discover that the French had lost the war and that they were now under British rule.
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When the British began to enact new polices for their recently acquired people and land, the
Native Americans were unwilling to comply with them.
Major General Jeffery Amherst, the commanding officer of the British forces in
North America, had the responsibility of implementing these new policies among the Native
Americans. Amherst, the ‘hero’ who overtook Montreal in 1760 to close the French and Indian
War in North America, was not interested in concilitiation with the Native Americans.39 By
late 1762, Amherst also had to deal with the drastic reduction of Britain’s once powerful army
due to the deployment of troops to participate in attacks on French and Spanish possessions in
the Caribbean.40 The remaining troops were spread so thinly around the newly conquered land
that Amherst found it hard to maintain proper garrisons. Each region had their own distinctive
way of treating the Native Americans, and this compounded disarray throughout the frontier.
Although people in the Louisiana territory intermarried with the Native Americans, people in
the Ohio region did not have any major ties to them. To enforce a universal Native American
policy also proved to be a problem because Amherst had to consider the differences in each tribe’s
viewpoint on political and economical issues.41 Amherst had a major challenge before him,
but whichever policy he employed, he had to consult Sir William Johnson, Native American
superintendent, which was a challenge in itself. Johnson, aside from being well-known for the
founding of Johnstown, New York, is also known for his cordial Native American policy. Amherst
felt Johnson was resistant to change, and oblivious to the economic pressures the crown faced
because he kept requesting money that Britian simply did not have.42 England was in a debt of
over a million dollars, and there was no money left to spend on North America. As troops were
deployed elsewhere, Britain focused its attention on more urgent problems and left Amherst to
employ his own policies.
Amherst’s first experience with Native Americans was when the Cherokees in the
Carolinas revolted against their former British allies in the summer of 1761.43 The Cherokees
traded not only deerskins but war captives from other tribes to South Carolina. There was
an immediate change, however, when Governor William H. Lyttelto imprisoned a group of
Cherokee chiefs.44 The Cherokees responded by revotling near Charleston, South Carolina. The
rebellion died down shortly but not before the Native Americans seized one frontier post, killing
twenty-five soldiers in the garrison.45 Amherst knew the level of destruction the Native Americans
were capable of and the British were already suspicious of their Iroquois allies who, during the
French and Indian War, had proven frequent deserters and thieves. In a letter to Pennsylvania
Governor James Hamilton, Amherst explained how he felt about his allies’ actions:
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If they do not behave as good and faithful allies ought to do, and renounce all acts
of hostilities against His Majesty’s subjects I shall retaliate upon them, and I have the
might so to do tenfold every breach of treaty they shall be guilty of and every outrage
they shall committ.46
With Amherst’s questioning of his Native American allies, and with the Cherokee conflict still
fresh in his mind, his first policy initiative was to cut back and deprive Native Americans of
arms and ammunition. In a letter to Sir William Johnson, Amherst proclaimed “we have it in
our power to reduce them to reason,” assuming that Native Americans would be less likely to
revolt without firearms.47
In addition to decreasing arms for the Native Americans, Amherst also wanted to reduce
the distribution of gifts to them as well. Amherst saw little need to supply Native Americans
with gifts, as the British were conquerors and the Native Americans were subjects. This new view
abolished Richard White’s ‘middle ground,’ which White argued grew “according to the need
of people to find a means, other than force, to gain the cooperation or consent of foreigners.”48
With England’s debt in mind, Amherst thought he was doing the crown a favor by limiting
gifts, and he verifies this in a letter to Sir William Johnson :
With regards to furnishing the [Indians], with a little cloathing, some arms &
ammunition to hunt with, that is all very well in cases of necessity; but as, when the
intended trade is established they will be able to supply themselves with these, from the
traders, for their furs, I do not see why the Crown should be put to that expense.49
The foundation of Amherst’s policy was to eliminate presents that served as a token of the entire
‘middle ground.’50 The French regularly presented gifts to the Native Americans as a sign of
diplomacy and peace, but Amherst saw gift giving, except in cases of dire need, as a bribe for
good behavior. While Amherst was justifiable in keeping the needs of Britain as his primary
objective, White would argue that he ultimately failed because he did not “convince [the Native
Americans] that some mutual action was fair and legitimate.”51 When the French had a conflict
with the Native Americans, they would try to “gain an audience” with them and speak with
kind words, calling them “their children,” in order to work out a mutual agreement, ‘a middle
ground.’52 The British, on the other hand, ignored the Native American’s opinion of the situation.
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The French, unlike the British, produced a Métis population from their intermarriage, “bound
by family, religion, and culture” to both the French and the Native Americans.53 Not only did
the Native Americans resent the new policy, especially the pro-French Great Lakes region, but
so did some British, Sir William Johnson among them.
Johnson, known by the Mohawks and other members of the League of Five Nations
as “Warrahhiyagey” or “the man who undertakes great things,” understood Native American
politics best and greatly opposed Amherst’s new policy.54 Johnson knew Amherst’s new plan
would bring about severe repercussions. Aside from representing diplomacy, the gifts were a
tribute to Native American chiefs and payment for allowing the whites to build forts on their
land.55 As White further described, Johnson tried to make Amherst “understand the world and
reasoning of others” because not only would Native American chiefs lose power because they
were not receiving tribute, but their suspicions of British intentions would be increased.56 In a
letter to Charles Wyndham, the Earl of Egremont and the newly appointed Secretary of State
for the Southern Department responsible for the American colonies, Johnson wrote:
Your lordship you will observe that the Indians are not only very uneasy, but jealous of
our growing power, which the enemy [France] (to engage them firmly in their interest)
had always told them would prove their ruin, as we should by degrees surround them
on every side, & at length extirpate them. . . . from the treatment they receive from
us, different from what they have been accustomed to by the French, who spared no
labor, or expense to gain their friendship and esteem, which along enabled them to
support the war in these parts.57
Johnson thought Amherst was naïve regarding the Native Americans’ capacity to wage war,
and the only way to prevent it was to treat them fairly and to keep them supplied with arms,
ammunition and, above all, gifts. Amherst, conversely, believed he had the power to demand
‘good behavior’ of Native Americans, rather than gifts, because he was the conqueror. Still,
Johnson argued that the expense of presents would greatly outweigh the cost of fighting a war
which the natives will not stop “until they have spread havoc over all the frontiers.”58 Except for
the elimination of presents and gunpowder to the Native Americans, Johnson did not “seriously
question British measures; [he] only criticized the speed with which they were taken and the
failure to negotiate them according to the diplomatic procedures of the middle ground.”59
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When Amherst repeatedly ignored Johnson’s warnings, Johnson said Amherst “was not at all
friend of Indians, which I am afraid may have bad consequences.”60
Johnson was not alone in opposing Amherst’s Native American policy. George Croghan,
Johnson’s deputy Indian agent, also believed that several provisions were cheaper than funding
a war against the Native Americans:
The British and French Colonies since the first settling [of ] America . . . have
adopted the Indian customs and manners by indulging them in treaties and renewing
friendships.61
Captain Donald Campbell, the commander of the British stronghold Fort Detroit, further
believed in a course of amiability and kindness when dealing with Native Americans. Campbell
supplied Native Americans near his fort with provisions such as ammunition, even though he
was fearful of going against the wishes of Amherst. To his defense, Campbell did “what [he]
thought was best for the service,” fearing a Native American uprising.62
The fear would materialize soon enough. In the summer of 1761, two Seneca—
Guyasuta, also known as Kiasuha, and Tahaiadoris—felt they were “ill treated” and called for a
council among the neighboring nations for the purpose of planning a strike against all British
garrisons.63 Angered by Amherst’s new policy, the Seneca leaders came to Detroit to distribute
war belts to the Ottawas, Hurons, and Chippewas “to take up the hatchet” and to “cut off the
English at Fort Detroit,” which would “give [them] the greatest joy and pleasure.”64 The war
belts, made of wampum and painted red, were sent to tribes as a summons of war. On the
contrary, a wampum belt painted white was given to an adversary to symbolize peace. The
Senecas, with the help of Pontiac, delivered red war belts and also made speeches to try and
motivate other tribes to join the cause.
Not long after the Senecas were in the region, Native Americans from the Wyandot
informed Campbell about their plan to attack his fort. Campbell told those members of the
Wyandot who informed him to go to the Seneca council and report the news back to him. The
Wyandot’s reported back about the Senecas’ well-constructed plan, triggered by Amherst’s new
policies, but more importantly they discovered that the tribes planned to act as one.65 When
Campbell learned of the plot, he called the local tribes into his own council and informed them
he was conscious of their scheme against the English and that he,
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Advise[d] [them] with all [his] heart in the most friendly manner, to return home and
ardently recommend it to your chiefs and those of other nations in concert with you
to quit their bad intentions and live in peace, for if they proceed in their designs again
the English it will terminate in their utter ruin and destruction.66
The conference ended with the Native Americans dispersing and Campbell convinced of
the Senecas’ candor, but in actuality the Native Americans reasoned that since their plan was
uncovered, they would wait patiently and allow the war belts to continue to circulate.67 Because
of the vastness of the frontier, not all the war belts that the Seneca leaders had dispersed had
reached their destination. Moreover, once a tribe had received the Seneca war belt, they could
circulate it among other tribes that were in their region to get more warriors.
The Seneca plot had mixed reactions throughout the British ranks. Amherst reasoned
that the uprising “never gave [him] momentous concern, as [he knew] of their incapacity of
attempting anything serious.”68 General Henry Bouquet, who was the commander of Fort
Pitt, one of the largest British forts, decided to not only bring British settlers who had been
living on the frontier inside the fort, but also to form two companies of militia to strengthen
the garrison. Although Bouquet took those precautions, he felt the entire Native American
plot would fail and that they “could only flatter themselves to succeed by surprise.”69 Johnson,
along with his deputy Croghan, however, did not take the plot lightly, and soon Johnson wrote
a letter to Amherst in which he exclaimed “[he was] very apprehensive that something not right
is brewing.”70 Johnson did not merely feel troubled over one tribe but all of the tribes. As the
British continued to deal with the Seneca hysteria, a new prophet from among the Delaware
was emerging, and presented new troubles for the crown.
This new prophet’s name was Neolin, who had supposedly fallen into a trance and
visited the Master of Life, the supreme deity in Native American culture. During this trance,
Neolin, or “Enlightened One,” came to three forks in the road, and after two were blocked, he
faced the third, alongside a woman who instructed him to purify himself before meeting with
the Master of Life.71 This part of Neolin’s trance symbolized for Native Americans a cleansing
of themselves of their “white ways” through purification, or ridding themselves of the English.72
After Neolin completed his purification process, he was able to listen to the Master of Life, who
provided him with a set of orders to take back:
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The land where ye dwell I have made for you and not for others. Whence comes it
that ye permits the whites upon your land. Can ye not live without them? Ye could
live as ye did before knowing them, before those whom ye call your brothers [the
English] had come upon your lands. Did ye not live by the bow and arrow? Ye had
no need for gun or power, or anything else. . . . As to those who trouble your lands,
drive them out, make war upon them. I do not love them at all; they know me not,
and are my enemies. . . . Send them back to the lands which I have created for them
and let them stay there.73
Neolin’s message served to further unify the diverse Native American people. The Delawares,
Shawnees and Mingoes, all from the Ohio Valley, and the Ottawas and Potawatomies from the
Great Lakes all came to believe that the Master of Life was punishing them for allowing the
British to come onto their land.74 Although Neolin denounced white practices, he really was
preaching Native American guilt for embracing the practices; the great advantage of accepting
guilt is that it restores power to the guilty party.75 The only way to change their fate was to
actively rid themselves of the English.
While spending time away from his fort in Philadelphia, Bouquet, who left Captain
Ecuyer to command Fort Pitt, was informed by Croghan that war belts were still spreading
among Native Americans throughout the frontier. The Native Americans felt it was “time for
them to prepare to defend themselves and their country from [the English].”76 When Amherst,
who knew of the short supply of troops at the forts, heard of the activity on the frontier, he was
surprisingly unworried. He felt the Native Americans’ “power [was] altogether insufficient,”
and that they would not “attempt any mischief.”77 While Neolin was a key motivator for the
Native Americans to take up arms against the British, Pontiac, leader of the Ottawa, was an
even bigger problem for them.
Pontiac further used Neolin’s religious awakening and on April 27, 1763 called all the
surrounding nations for a grand council to discuss an attack.78 Parkman admiringly stated that
Pontiac, whose name was respected “from the sources of the Ohio to those of the Mississippi
and to the farthest boundaries of the wide-spread Algonquin race,” was determined to launch
a surprise attack against the British.79 A great orator, Pontiac called the grand council, which
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consisted of the Potawatomies, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Hurons, to meet a short distance from
Fort Detroit.80 There, Pontiac used the doctrine of the prophet Neolin and the Master of Life
as a supernatural sanction for his conspiracy, and inspired the Native Americans to go to war.81
Pontiac preached to the council who looked upon him as an “oracle” that the Master of Life
had directed them to “drive off [their] lands those dogs clothed in red who will do nothing but
harm.”82 In his speech, Pontiac urged them to take up arms and rid themselves of the British.
The discourse by Pontiac and the fact that some Native Americans had received war belts two
years prior to the council stimulated everyone because they were anxious and ready for war.
The message was clear: Native Americans must not only purge themselves of English customs,
but eradicate the foreigners from their land.
To have a greater chance of a victorious attack in Fort Detroit, Pontiac conceived of a
plan that would allow both himself and his followers a better assessment of the fort. On May 1,
1763, while Pontiac and fifty of his faithful Ottawas approached Fort Detroit and were admitted
to perform a ceremonial dance for the commander of the fort, Major Henry Gladwin, a few
snuck off once inside and looked around to locate the British’s barracks and defenses.83 Gladwin
and his soldiers were not worried about Native Americans sneaking around prior to this event,
for they had always been restless but never deceptive.84 When the ceremony came to an end,
Gladwin did not suspect anything to be astray, and Pontiac informed the British that he would
return again in a couple of days so that more of his tribe could meet the commander.
Once back in their village, the Ottawas prepared for the attack. Pontiac held a council
meeting at the Potawatomi village on May 5 and exclaimed passionately to them:
It is important for us, my brothers, that we exterminate from our lands [the English
who seek] only to destroy us. . . . When I go to see the English commander and say
to him that some of our comrades are dead, instead of bewailing their death. . . . He
laughs at me and at you. . . . Therefore, my brothers, we must all swear their destruction
and wait no longer.85
At the council it was decided that on May 7, Pontiac and sixty warriors with tomahawks and
other weapons hidden under their blankets would enter the fort while their women would enter
with muskets under their clothing.86 Pontiac would use a wampum belt to signal the attack
inside the fort while the other Potawatomies, outside the fort, would attack any English with
whom they came in contact.87 Although Pontiac employed a wampum belt in a new and creative
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way, using the belt as a weapon rather than for the more traditional purpose of a summons of
war, his plan would end up being spoiled regardless.
Although Pontiac’s plan was well organized, Gladwin and his troops were soon informed
by several Ottawa Indians who were reluctant to fight. At this, the English began to frantically
prepare the fort for an attack. On May 7, Pontiac and his warriors returned to the fort and
were startled by the sight of the whole garrison at arms. Pontiac said to Gladwin, “We would be
very glad to know the reason for this, for we imagine some bird has given thee ill news of us.”88
Rightfully chagrined and bewildered that their plan had been uncovered, Pontiac assured the
soldiers of the misunderstanding and told the British that he would return once again to smoke
the peace pipe.89 Now well aware of the Native Americans’ plot, Gladwin and his troops had
more time to prepare and to welcome in any families living outside of the fortification’s walls.
When Pontiac and his warriors arrived back on May 9, the guard at the front of the gate was
ordered to only let Pontiac and a couple of his leading men in. Pontiac, taking this as a sign of
disrespect because all the Native Americans wanted to be involved in the ceremony, told the
guard to tell Gladwin “that he may stay in his fort, and that I will keep the country.”90 Pontiac
and his warriors returned to their village, picked up their hatchets and tomahawks and charged
at Fort Detroit. With that, the siege of Fort Detroit had begun.
Chanting their war song, Pontiac and his willing warriors killed twenty-four head
of cattle and even British Sergeant Fisher and his family on the way to Fort Detroit.91 Once
arriving at the fort, Pontiac ordered the Ottawas to watch the north side of the fort to prevent
anyone from entering, while the rest of the warriors tried to hide themselves as firing began
from the British. Pontiac, low on supplies, arranged for a peace talk during the cease-fire,
and sent envoys to the garrison with the hopes of truce. The British, with a lack of provisions
themselves, entertained the idea and sent Captain Campbell, accompanied by Lieutenant George
McDougall, to converse with the Native Americans because not only would it take months to
get word to Amherst for supplies, but even if the supplies did come they would be confiscated
by Pontiac.92
The two British officers apprehensively walked with Pontiac to the house of Antoine
Cuillerier, a Frenchman involved in the rebellion.93 Pontiac told them that if the British
abandoned Fort Detroit and their provisions, they would be allowed to march to Fort Niagara.
The officers asserted that they would have to bring the proposal back to Gladwin, but just as they
were about to depart, Pontiac seized them both and unexpectedly made them hostages.94 The
translator of the confrontation, Pierre LaButte, went back and informed Gladwin of Pontiac’s
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terms and of the capture of two of his officers, but the commander would not negotiate while
his officers were held prisoner.95 The siege continued after the two sides failed to reach an
agreement. The siege eventually ended in a stalemate in October, six months after it began, but
not before British captives were taken and eventually killed. The attack on Detroit brought the
British’s worst fear to life, but it was only the beginning of the brutal violence that would ensue.
The first British fort to fall was Fort Sandusky. Stationed along Lake Erie in Ohio,
this was a crucial fort to attack because it was on the vital trail of communication between Fort
Detroit and Fort Pitt. The commander of the fort, Ensign Christopher Pauli, was on peaceful
terms with nearby Wyandots. After being encouraged by Ottawas and Wyandots already involved
in Pontiac’s plan, the nearby Wyandots acquiesced to join in the war and on May 16 went to
Fort Sandusky and requested to speak with Pauli.96 Pauli, unsuspecting of trouble, allowed
them to enter and they quickly scattered around the fort emitting war cries as they slaughtered
and scalped the troops, fifteen in all.97 Having achieved their goal, the Wyandots then burned
the garrison, and spared Pauli, whom they took with them as a prisoner.98 The Wyandots and
Ottawas suffered no casualties in this victory at Sandusky and it helped motivate other Native
Americans to join the fight.99
The next British fort to be attacked fell in a very similar fashion to that of Ft. Sandusky.
Located in southern Michigan, Fort St. Joseph, commanded by Ensign Francis Schlosser, was
greeted on the morning of May 25 with a small group of Potawatomies who wanted to introduce
their relatives to the commander.100 The commander consented, and when the Potawatomies left
to get their relatives, Schlosser was warned by a French resident of a possible attack.101 By the
time Schlosser rushed back to his barracks to warn his undersized regiment of men, he found the
garrison swarming with Native Americans. Before Schlosser had time to arm himself, a war cry
was heard, and within two minutes the Potawatomies killed everyone except Schlosser and two
others. The Native Americans were deceptive in their attacks not only because they wanted to
outmaneuver their adversary, but because they felt their actions were justifiable since they were
being cheated by Britain’s new policy in regard to the allocation of gifts. An alarming pattern
of treachery was developing, one to which the British were not accustomed.
The pattern of duplicity continued with the attack on Fort Miami. Commanded by
Ensign Robert Holmes, its location was strategic: the intersection of the St. Mary and St. Joseph
Rivers in northeastern Indiana, which was the direct route between Canada and Louisiana.102
When he was warned of cannon fire coming from the direction of Detroit, unlike most British
officers who ignored rumors, Holmes put his small company of men on guard and prepared
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for an attack. Yet Holmes, who was an experienced frontier officer, had foolishly taken a Native
American mistress. When a Native American from the Miami village was sick, Holmes’s
mistress convinced him to assist, and no sooner than he arrived at the village he was killed by
a member of the Miami tribe. The remaining soldiers at Fort Miami naturally shut their gates
in worry. Two French messengers Jacques Godfroy and Mini Chene, acting on behalf of the
Native Americans, approached the fort and convinced the British to surrender, but not before
looting the fort and killing four of the eleven soldiers that were left.103 The deception of the
Native Americans had deepened, and this time it involved a woman.
Located along the Wabash River in southwestern Indiana, the fourth British fort to fall
by duplicity was Fort Ouiatenon, commanded by Lieutenant Edward Jenkins. Jenkins, much
like Pauli at Sandusky, was on very good terms with local tribes. However, the Ottawa told the
Weas, Kickapoos, and Mascoutens about their past victories and influenced them to join in
the attack.104 The lieutenant was not aware of the Native Americans’ past victories, and when
the local tribes asked him to meet for a council, Jenkins had no suspicions of an attack. When
Jenkins appeared at the council he was immediately seized, and his whole feeble garrison soon
surrendered but not before the local tribes who subdued them asserted that they were “sorry,
but that they were obliged to do it by the other nations.”105 Although the fourth British fort
to fall, the Native Americans had yet to take a major garrison; but that was about to change.
The first major fort the Native Americans victoriously attacked turned out to be
the bloodiest.106 Fort Michilimackinac, a major fur-trading center in northern Michigan,
commanded by Captain George Etherington consisted of over forty men and was one of the
larger garrisons the British possessed.107 Stubborn to a fault, when a French resident warned
Etherington about Native American activity in the area, he ignored the caution and “threatened
to send the next person who should bring a story of the same kind a prisoner to Detroit.”108 A
few days later on June 2, numerous Chippewa and Sauk congregated outside the Etherington’s
fort to engage in a game of lacrosse.109 The fort was not on alert, so British officers and soldiers
alike went outside of the fortification to watch the game. As the game went on, Native Americans
purposely tossed the ball inside the fort, and as they rushed in to retrieve it, they were handed
weapons that were hidden under the blankets of their women, and opened fired on the helpless
garrison.110 When the fighting ended, twenty-one British soldiers had been killed, while others,
including Etherington, were held hostage.111

Todish, British Military, 57.
Dixon, Peace Again, 120.
105
Nester, Haughty Conquerors, 91.
106
Peckham, Pontiac, 163.
107
Todish, British Military, 58.
108
Ibid., 58.
109
Nester, Haughty Conquerors, 96.
110
Dowd, War, 93.
111
Dixon, Peace Again, 123.
103
104

53

The Native Americans spared Etherington and his soldiers’ lives, but not before the
commander promised more captives. Etherington wrote a letter to Lieutenant James Gorrell, the
commander of Fort Edward Augustus, ordering their small garrison to join him and his men.112
If the Native Americans could take one of the British’s larger forts in Fort Michilimackinac,
he knew Gorrell’s garrison would be no match for them. On the same day as the attack on
Etherington’s fort, Fort Ligonier, commanded by Lieutenant Archibald Blane, purposely set fire
to some of its structures rather than surrender it to the Native Americans. Fort Edward Augustus
and Ligonier, not as vital or as large as Michilimackinac, likewise fell to the Native Americans
without much of a struggle. The triumphant attack on Etherington’s fort was a key victory for
the Native Americans. By taking one of the larger British forts, it raised not only the Native
Americans’ confidence and persuaded more tribes to join the attack, but it demonstrated to the
British how severe this insurgence truly was.
Positioned in western Pennsylvania, Fort Venango was commanded by Lieutenant
Francis Gordon and fifteen Royal Americans. The fort fell on June 16 to the Senecas through
the same deceptive circumstances as Michilimackinac: a game of lacrosse.113 Once the Senecas
rushed inside, with the help of the Mingoes, they slaughtered every soldier except Gordon.
Instead of killing Gordon on the spot, they forced him to write down their grievances to the
crown:
the scarcity and dearness of [gun] powder for these two years past. . . . [and] the
English keeping so many posts in their country [which] gave them reason to think
that [the English] were determined to posses their country, therefore we would destroy
[the English].114
After the letter was written, the Senecas burned not only the fort, but Gordon too. The Senecas
then sent the correspondence with a party of warriors who were traveling to Fort Pitt, and were
told to drop the letter on the way with the intentions that the English would find it and raise
tensions along the frontier.115 Although the purpose behind the letter was to justify to the British
their reasoning for the attacks, it was fortunate that the letter was found by a British officer and
not lost in the vastness of the frontier.
The Mingoes and Senecas then moved north to attack Fort LeBeouf. The western
Pennsylvania fort, commanded by Ensign George Price, had a small squadron of thirteen
other soldiers on guard when they were warned by other British officers at Fort Presque Isle
that Native Americans had attacked Fort Detroit.116 The Native Americans appeared at Price’s
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fort on July 18, and after being turned away twice by the British upon asking for provisions
assuming they were insincere, attacked. Aided by the Delawares, the three tribes added to their
gunfire by shooting flaming arrows at the fort’s structures.117 As fire spread, the soldiers wanted
to evacuate the fort, but were compelled to stay by Price who exclaimed, “We must fight as
long as we can, and then die together.”118 If they were going to die, however, it would not be
fighting the Native Americans, because before long, Price gave in to his soldiers’ demand and
ordered a retreat. The ninth British fort had fallen.
The Native Americans then concentrated their manpower to Fort Presque Isle, one of
the larger British garrisons with twenty-nine men located in Erie, Pennsylvania; it was a another
crucial link on the communication trail between Forts Detroit and Pitt.119 Commandeered by
Ensign John Christie, whom Amherst praised for “being prepared for the defense of his post,”
soon made Amherst regret his cordial words.120 On the morning of July 20, the soldiers awoke
to find that nearly two hundred and fifty Native American warriors from four nations had
strategically set themselves upon two hills overlooking the garrison.121 Like the attack at Fort
LeBeouf, these Native Americans once again used flaming arrows to subdue the fort. After two
days of fighting and a continual bombardment of flaming arrows, which Christie later called a
“smart” strategy, the Native Americans broke through the fort’s gates and set fire to the officers’
quarters.122 Convinced he was outflanked and that the Native Americans would only take the
garrison and not harm his soldiers, Christie surrendered. Rather than live up to their words, the
Native Americans divided the soldiers into groups for each tribe to take as their captives. Amherst
would later write “It is amazing that [Christie] could put so much faith in the promises of the
Indians.”123 Christie was not alone in both trusting the Native Americans and not thinking
anything was amiss. With the exception of Fort Presque Isle in which they used sheer force, the
Native Americans used deception in every other fort attack. The tenth British fort had fallen,
and there was no sign of the Native Americans slowing their attacks.
Throughout late May and June, the soldiers at Fort Pitt under the command of Captain
Ecuyer were informed of the destruction on the frontier. William Trent, an Indian trader and
Indian agent before taking up the commanding job of the militia at Pitt, wrote down the day
to day details of living at the fort. Trent’s rationale for keeping a journal at Fort Pitt was to
encompass everything from the daily activities of the fort to first-hand accounts from others
about the annihilation on the frontier by Native Americans.124 Bias in his journal, if any, can
be seen in the latter, which contains an overwhelming cultural fear of Native Americans and
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misconstrued information due to the poor communication of frontier life. Nonetheless, Trent’s
journal not only gives the most detailed accounts available of life in Fort Pitt during the siege
of 1763, but also highlights the succession of brutality leading up to Captain Ecuyer’s famous
decision regarding the smallpox-infested blankets.
Similar to the siege of other forts, Native American attacks were prevalent around the
outlying regions of Fort Pitt in early June. Trent wrote on May 29 about both the death of Colonel
William Clapham at his home and of two soldiers who were at the sawmill.125 Emotions at Fort
Pitt were heightened by this news because Clapham’s homestead, along with the sawmill, were
a mere twenty-five miles from their fort.126 Ecuyer, convinced that a Native American uprising
was certain, dispatched riders to Philadelphia to inform Bouquet that he thought “the [Native
American] uprising [was] general [and] that he tremble[d] for [his] post.”127 Well aware of the
Native Americans’ hostile actions and close proximity to his fort, Ecuyer began to prepare for
an attack.
The day after Ecuyer dispatched the letter to Bouquet, Trent’s journal illustrated more
ambushes and attacks on British settlers living on the frontier that were within the vicinity of
Fort Pitt. On May 30, 1763, Trent writes of Thomas Calhoun, a profitable trader at the time,
who had arrived at Fort Pitt from the village of Tuscarawas with crucial news. Calhoun was
instructed by Delaware Chiefs on the May 27 to leave his trading post with his men on the
Tuscarawas, because they did not want to see him killed.128 As Calhoun and his men made
their way to Fort Pitt, Trent describes how they were fired upon by Native Americans, which
killed all but Calhoun and two others. After telling of his heroic escape to the fort, he further
explained to Captain Ecuyer that the Delaware Chiefs also told him that, “Detroit was taken,
the post at Sandusky burnt and all the garrison put to death, except the officer who they made
prisoner.”129
Aside from Fort LeBeouf, Fort Pitt is unique in that it received firsthand accounts of
the destruction of other forts, which undoubtedly prepared them for an attack. Even though
Trent’s account depicts a Native American victory at Fort Detroit, in actuality the fort did not
fall, but as already stated, was stalemated. Still, Ecuyer had no other eyewitness accounts by which
to act and truly believed that Fort Detroit, same in size and stature as Pitt, had fallen. While
this alarmed him, so too did the surrendering of Fort Sandusky, which showed that the Native
Americans were not just attacking major forts. Within Trent’s brief account from Calhoun, he
rendered Ecuyer and the British army’s fear of a Native American uprising a reality.
Within a week, on June 7, Trent described an account by Lieutenant Abraham Cuyler
that told of “Lieut. Schlossers Post [being] destroyed.”130 Cuyler was on a vessel with 139 barrels
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of provisions en route to Fort Detroit when he was attacked by Native Americans. He then made
his retreat to Fort Sandusky, which was already destroyed, and on to Fort Presque Isle where he
learned of the Native Americans’ victory at Schlosser’s Fort St. Joseph.131 When William Trent
and Captain Ecuyer heard news from John Calhoun and Lieutenant Cuyler of the destruction
of their British forts, they tightened up their patrols with the thought that their time would
soon come to defend Fort Pitt. The Native Americans periodically attempted to draw Ecuyer’s
soldiers out of their fort by setting fire to structures surrounding it, but the commander knew
of their past deception and later wrote to Bouquet “[Native Americans] would like to decoy
me and make me send out detachments, but they will not fool me.”132 Even though Fort Pitt
was the largest and most expensive of the western forts, Fort Detroit, which they thought had
been taken, was the largest post of the Upper Great Lakes.133 Upon taking Sandusky and
then St. Joseph, Ecuyer thought that Native Americans had taken three major forts in a row,
understandably concluding that this strengthened not only the latter’s confidence in their own
skills, but had also given them “expansive ideas” of further attacks.134
On June 22, Native Americans, made mostly of Delawares, attacked Fort Pitt in
hopes of continuing their victorious streak. Trent wrote in his journal that a “great number of
Indians appeared on each river and on Grant’s Hill” and began firing on the fort.135 The firing
lessened when Ecuyer ordered an explosive shell be thrown at the Native Americans, but the
latter soon recovered as the night drew on. On June 4, a week after Ecuyer sent his dispatches,
due in part to the vastness of the conflict ridden frontier, they were received by Bouquet who
then sent them to Amherst in New York. Amherst felt “this alarm will end in nothing more
than a rash attempt of what the Senecas have been threatening and which we have heard of for
some time past.”136 Still, he assembled two light infantry regiments to hold in Staten Island.
Within five days of sending troops to Staten Island, Amherst abruptly ordered them to march
to Philadelphia to aid Bouquet. This was because Amherst had received word of Pontiac’s
actions to the west and wrote “I find the affairs of the Indians, appears to be more general that
I had apprehended.”137 Amherst’s immediate deployment of troops displays the urgency he
must have felt for his forts. Throughout most of his dealings with Sir William Johnson, he was
always careful with his provisions as well as his short supply of men. Although Amherst took
the initiative to send troops to Bouquet, ten British forts had already fallen, with an attack on
Fort Pitt in motion.
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According to Trent, two chiefs, Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee, came before the fort
for a truce on June 24 and announced that “all [British] _____ as Ligonier was destroyed.”138
Although the information in Trent’s journal for this entry is misconstrued and missing a crucial
word, one could read it as, “All British forts as far as Ligonier was destroyed.” Native Americans
spread word of their victories at forts to other tribes and regions with the hopes of drawing them
in. Therefore, it is very likely that Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee knew of past British forts
falling. Although Trent’s journal, up to that entry, was written in a very concise and decipherable
style, he wrote on June 24 that he was in the midst of a battle, and hence he was doubtlessly
more worried about the fort’s well being than the clarity of his journal. Nonetheless, even if the
excerpt from Trent’s journal only meant Fort Ligioner had fallen, then the British would still
be troubled to think another British fort fell, making their own total at four.
The two chiefs, representing six nations, told Ecuyer several nations were ready to
attack but were going to give the fort time to surrender and retreat.139 Ecuyer thanked them
but declined, and the chiefs told the fort that they would return after conversing with the other
nations. As commander of Fort Pitt, Ecuyer knew he had to ward off the Native Americans and
defend his garrison. With the assumption that Detroit had fallen, Pitt was the last major British
stronghold the Natives had not taken. When the chiefs came back a second time to inform the
commander they were going to hold their position, they requested some provisions for their
journey home. Ecuyer, who was well aware of Native American deception, thought they only
wanted the provisions in order to enter his fort and attack. The Native Americans had already
attempted to draw the commander and his soldiers out of Fort Pitt, and they could easily be
attempting to use the same setup again. Ecuyer decided to provide the chiefs with some rations,
but among the supplies he deceptively gave them the infamously deadly gift: smallpox. While
the two chiefs may have been suspicious that the British distributed gifts to them, they may
have also thought the British finally capitulated, and realized that they could not win the war.
Trent’s words confirm without a doubt Britain’s non-capitulating offensive strategy: “Out of
our regard to [the chiefs] we gave them two blankets and a handkerchief out of the smallpox
hospital. I hope it has the desired effect.”140
Trent and Ecuyer used this aggressive approach because they were well aware of the
trickery that Native Americans used to besiege prior forts. That “desired effect” was to infect
those two Native American chiefs with smallpox. The chiefs, then, would spread it amongst
their tribe. When the two chiefs came to talk during the parley, Ecuyer did not know what
their true intentions were. Ecuyer was conscious of the deception used at the prior forts where,
for example, Native Americans guided British officers back to their camp under the guise of
hospitality and then captured them. Aside from the craftiness Native Americans used, Ecuyer
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also knew of their manpower and the lack of the British’s around the frontier. Due in part to
the majority of Britain’s army being deployed after the French and Indian War to other places,
and the scattered placement of British forts around the extensive frontier, the ‘powerful’ British
army was spread so thin they could not maintain suitable garrisons. Along with Fort Detroit, if
Fort Pitt had fallen, two of the largest British forts on the frontier would have been in the hands
of Native Americans. If Fort Detroit, one of the largest forts in the country at that time was
surrendered, Fort Pitt had just as much of a chance of seizure. To Captain Ecuyer, the Native
Americans had just taken four major forts from the British, and were coming for Fort Pitt next
with the strength of not only manpower but of motivation behind them. He was confident of
the ability and morale of his men, but did not want to risk surrendering his fort. The Native
Americans’ underhanded victories at the previous forts thus compelled the disheartened British
to employ germ warfare among them with the hope that it would stop their attack on Fort
Pitt.
Even though there has been much discussion about Amherst and the infamous gifts,
Captain Ecuyer and the other officers at Fort Pitt should be the ones to receive the credit for the
idea.141 Ecuyer had already distributed the blankets when Amherst wrote to Bouquet on July
7, 1763 and stressed that “every commanding officer [should] never trust [Native American]
promises,” and then questioned “could it not be contrived to send the smallpox among the
disaffected tribes of Indians?”142 Amherst’s letter to Bouquet belittled any notion that Ecuyer
and his officers at Fort Pitt gave the blankets to the Native Americans with sincere kindness;
on the contrary, it was out of distrust. This declaration of mistrusting promises grew out of
Amherst’s knowledge of his fallen forts to the deceptive Native Americans. The conditions of
the frontier meant that Amherst was always notified late of the Native American conflicts,
while Ecuyer was informed of the destruction on the frontier daily as described through Trent’s
journal.143 Ecuyer knew he could not await Amherst’s orders, and on June 24, acted on his
own when Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee came to his fort.
Although the British were commanded by Ecuyer, they may have been influenced to
distribute the smallpox blankets by William Trent himself. Among the records of William Trent’s
trading firm’s account against the crown it reads “The sundries to replace in kind those which were
taken from people in the hospital to convey the small-pox to the Indians.”144 Recent scholars
credit Trent for the infamous idea because not only was Ecuyer an inexperienced commander,
but because he was furious that his trading industry was declining partly because of the Native
Americans’ unrest.145 Trent was even further enraged when Native Americans stole ten horses
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that personally belonged to him.146 Not only were the Native Americans killing his customers,
but they were making families living on the frontier disperse to other places. Even though Trent
was an experienced soldier, his military skills were not highly regarded. Nevertheless, Ecuyer
leaned heavily on Trent, who had spent much time on the frontier among Native Americans.147
Still, even if Trent had come up with the plan because he had a personal vendetta against the
Native Americans, Ecuyer was still in charge of the fort and was consulted on all matters. Ecuyer
would not jeopardize his career as a British officer simply to satisfy the vengeance feelings Trent
had towards the Native Americans. Although Trent was concerned with his declining financial
stability, his duties as a soldier came first and was enraged that the Native Americans took ten
British forts practically unopposed. Ecuyer ordered the blankets as an aggressive approach to
halt the Native Americans victories, not to please Trent.
Although it was first believed that the blankets were successful in killing many Native
Americans, recent studies belittle the blankets’ effects. In 1851, when Parkman’s book was
published, he stated that the blankets “made havoc among the tribes.”148 A reexamination of
the incident, however, indicated that the British experiment in germ warfare may well have been
a failure. Although the blanket incident was Britain’s first trial with germ warfare, the Native
Americas attempted their own experiment in 1761 by trying to poison a well at Fort Ligonier
“in hopes to hurt ye people.”149 The British, much like the Native Americans in 1761, would
come up short of their desired effect. In March 1765, a Delaware chief told William Johnson
that “the Shawanes lost in three months time a hundred and forty nine men besides women and
children by sickness above a year ago, also many of them dyed last summer of the smallpox.”150
This account indicates that the epidemic took hold sometime later than June 1763, when the
blankets were distributed to the Native Americans. Moreover, another eyewitness account in
1764 stated that “the smallpox has been very general and raging amongst the Indians since last
spring” and has killed many Mingoes, Delawares and Shawneese.151 This statement, on the
other hand, indicated that the epidemic began before June 1763, long before Ecuyer presented
the infected blankets. Perhaps the most crucial piece of evidence that belittles the effects of the
smallpox blankets was the return of Turtle’s Heart and Maumaultee, the chiefs who received
the blankets, to Fort Pitt a full month later. While it is plausible that both chiefs were already
immune to the disease, it is more likely that the plot failed. Had the scheme succeeded, the
“Indians vesting the fort would have been reeling from the plague.”152 If the Native Americans
had contracted the disease they would have certainly abandoned their disease-infested location
surrounding Fort Pitt and moved to a healthier area. In contrast, the Native Americans continued
with the siege through the end of July.
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The siege at Fort Pitt would come to an end not because of smallpox, but due to the
advancing British forces led by Bouquet, who would eventually turn the tide of the war. When
the Native Americans encountered the British Army led by Bouquet, the Battle of Bushy Run
would commence. After the British fought to victory, they moved on and later relieved Fort
Pitt on August 20. Even though the Native Americans retaliated a month later when they killed
seventy-two British soldiers by Fort Niagara, after 1763, major combat in Pontiac’s War was
effectively over. In 1763 Amherst was recalled back to London, and replaced by General Thomas
Gage, who was more willing to listen to Johnson in regard to Native American policy. The
Native Americans, lacking ammuntion and realizing they could not wipe out the British, were
ready to negotiate. Upon signing the Treaty of Fort Niagara in 1764, and securing peace with
the Seneca, Wyandot, Ojibwas and others, the British conducted two military operations that
concluded in 1765, to further obtain peace from those Native Americans who were unwilling
to negoaite.153 George Croghan, Johnson’s deputy, was sent in 1765 to the Illinois Country to
persuade Pontiac to accompany him to New York where he could sign an official treaty of Peace
with Johnson. The British knew no lasting peace treaty was possible without his approval; on
July 25, 1766, a formal treaty was signed thus ending the rebellion.154 Although no lands were
ceded and no prisoners were returned, it was the “first major multi-tribal war against European
invaders that ended in accommodation, rather than complete Amerindian defeat.”155
While there was tension with Native Americans prior to the French and Indian War,
tensions only intensified after the victor, Britain, reconfigured a new policy. Before and during
the war the French treated the Native Americans as equals. They established a long standing
economy with and even lived among them. The gifts of good fruits and diplomacy the French
presented to the various chiefs had additional meaning. When a chief went back to his tribe
with the presents he had received, it reassured the tribe of their chief ’s power and authority.
When the British applied new policy changes, specifically reducing the distribution of gifts
and armory, chiefs were the first ones to worry. The chiefs knew they would lose power among
their own people by being unable to bring back those two valuable necessities to their tribes.
In general, the British’s policy changes were foreign and offensive to the Native Americans
who had followed French guidelines for years. To the British, their new ‘subjects’ were an
impediment to their expansion, and a drain on their economy; the Native Americans could
not live harmoniously because British rule by definition meant domination. When the Native
Americans unsuspectingly revolted, the British were not only caught off guard, but bewildered
to learn that their newly acquired ‘subjects,’ now adversaries, were so organized and deceptive
in their attacks.
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Within three months of the British imposing their new policies, which reduced the
status of Native Americans from allies to their new ‘subjects,’ Native Americans realized that
they would have to rise up to regain what they originally had. In only two months, the Native
Americans had not only made the British army’s fear a reality, but they created a new fear that
their treachery and man power might even be able to overtake them. These new policies were
centered around the needs of the British and did not consider the needs of their new ‘subjects.’
Native Americans now had to adjust to not receiving the guns and ammunitions to which
they had been accustomed. In turn, their chiefs suffered from losing the prestige they once
encompassed within their tribes. By taking ten British forts, Native Americans thus reasserted
their claim to their own land and were truly “masters of their country.”156 Their victories,
nevertheless, would stop short of their goal: as the British purged the land of them, the tide
of the rebellion would turn. By taking the land and its inhabitants who had lived there for
thousands of years, the British imposed an incontestable policy of domination in which Native
Americans were an impediment to British rule and needed to be eliminated.
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Pope John Paul II, the Assassination Attempt,
and the Soviet Union


Daniel Scotto
“The attempt to murder the pope remains one of the century’s great mysteries,” wrote
Carl Bernstein and Marco Politti in their 1996 biography of Pope John Paul II.1 Indeed, the
mystery has remained unsolved since the pope was shot and wounded on May 13, 1981. A
recent investigation concluded that the Soviet government was the perpetrator, but the situation
should be examined in a broader historical context. What actually happened on May 13, 1981?
Was it the sole decision and action of Mehmet Ali Agca, who was expressing his opposition
to “Western imperialist policies,” as he had written in a threatening letter to a newspaper in
1979?2 Or had “someone else commissioned him to carry it out,” as Pope John Paul II alleged
in a memoir written in 2005?3
Before evaluating the question from an historical standpoint, it is necessary to provide
some background in order to establish a potential motive for the Soviet Union to support such
an assassination attempt. Was Karol Wojtyla (the Pope’s birth name) really “[their] enemy,” as
a party directive warned in 1979?4 Only then can we evaluate the Soviet Union’s involvement,
or whether there was a conspiracy behind the attempted assassination of John Paul II at all.
Finally, we should step back and look at the significance of the assassination attempt and the
impact of the pope on the Cold War and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe.
The Rise of Karol Wojtyla
Although he was not elected to the papacy until 1978, Karol Wojtyla first became
a concern of the Soviet Union in 1971. As part of a major surveillance initiative across the
Soviet Bloc, the KGB monitored the activities of Wojtyla, “whom the Centre considered the
leading ideological influence on the Polish Church.”5 Poland’s equivalent of the KGB, the
Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa (SB), had considered bringing charges against Wojtyla as early as 1973
under article 194 of Poland’s Criminal Code, forbidding “seditious statements during religious
services.” His fame and his status, however, prevented his arrest.6
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Upon his election to the papacy in 1978, the SB sent a report to Moscow, noting
that Wojtyla held “extreme anti-Communist views” and had accused the Polish government
of restricting human rights, exploiting workers, imposing atheism on society, and denying the
Catholic Church its traditional role in Polish culture.7 The National Review, a conservative
American publication, was prescient in its evaluation of the pope’s election, saying that “the
papacy of John Paul II may [open] a huge fault along the Western edge of the Soviet empire,
where Catholicism still has immeasurable latent power... the lights must be burning late in
the Kremlin.”8 Indeed, the Soviet Union feared this very occurrence. The news enraged Yuri
Andropov, head of the KGB, who quickly grasped the significance of the selection of a Polish
pope. Soon after hearing the news, he called the KGB’s rezident in Warsaw and angrily asked,
“How could you possibly allow the election of a citizen of a socialist country as pope?”9 Many
in the Polish and Soviet governments believed that the United States had conspired to elect
Wojtyla to the papacy in order to help undermine the Communist government in Poland.10
Furthermore, one of John Paul’s first actions was to declare his support for universal human
rights, with a focus on Poland and Eastern Europe.11
The Soviet Bloc was justifiably concerned with the prospect of the new pope’s inevitable
return to Poland. Premier Brezhnev suggested that Edward Gierek, the Polish leader, should
persuade the pope to contract a so-called “diplomatic illness” in order to prevent him from
visiting Poland. This absurd suggestion accurately embodies the sentiments in the Soviet Union:
utter disbelief at Wojytla’s election and confusion about how to tolerate it.12
Realistically, it was impossible for the Soviet Union to prevent Pope John Paul II from
visiting Poland. He was greeted warmly on June 2, 1979 by 20,000 people at the airport, and
290,000 worshippers heard the pope offer the Pontifical Mass in Warsaw. In his homily, he
declared,
The exclusion of Christ from the history of man is an act against man... I am asking
all of you, through the great eucharistic prayer, that Christ will not cease to be for us
an open book of life for the future, for our Polish future.13
In his short homily, John Paul II essentially denounced the communist regime for its exclusion
of religion. Soon after, while speaking with Gierek, he announced that “The church wishes
to serve people also in the temporal dimension of their life and existence. By establishing a
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religious relationship with people, the church consolidates them in their natural social bonds.”
This directly challenged the regime in Poland; one Polish Catholic editor noted that the pope
had become “tougher” than he had been in the past.14
Formally, the pope was visiting Poland to commemorate the 900th anniversary of the
death of St. Stanislaw, Poland’s patron saint who was martyred for “[daring] to tell the king
himself that he was bound to respect the law of God.”15 In the days before assuming the papacy,
Wojtyla’s homilies frequently referenced St. Stanislaw, who had become a symbol of Polish
opposition to the communist regime.16 Even the timing of the visit was political.
Undoubtedly, the visit to Poland was wholly unfavorable for the communist leadership
in Poland and the Soviet Union. The pope spent much of his nine days in Poland attacking the
very foundations of the communist system, declaring that man “could not be regarded only as a
‘means of production.’” The impact was not lost on the media at the time; one article declared
that the Pope had “demonstrated that his voice would be a source of enormous influence in
Eastern Europe.”17 And, as unfortunate as the pope’s “triumphant” return to Poland was for
both the Polish communist government and the Soviet government, the Polish government itself
had further struggles. The Gdansk Accords, signed on August 31, included major concessions
to striking workers, were signed. When Lech Walesa, the leader of the movement, signed the
Accords, he used a large, gaudy pen, one bearing a portrait of John Paul II.18 The Polish resistance
to Soviet domination now had its spiritual leader (John Paul II) in addition to its official leader
(Lech Walesa).19
This background is essential to the history of the attempted assassination of John
Paul II. It is inconceivable to imagine someone in Soviet Russia or Poland making a rational,
calculated decision to order the pope’s assassination without understanding the impact of the
pope on Poland and its communist leadership. Jonathan Steele and Eric Abraham noted that
“Establishing a motive [on its own]… is not enough to prove that Andropov would have ordered
his men to arrange to have the pope killed.”20 Still, it is necessary to establish a motive before
we further examine the assassination attempt.
The Assassination Attempt on John Paul II
While the exact nature and purpose of the attempted murder of John Paul II are in question,
the methodology and specific details of it are not. On May 13, 1981, at 5:19 PM, just before
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the start of his weekly general audience, John Paul II was shot by Mehmet Ali Agca in St. Peter’s
Square in the Vatican. Agca fired four shots from a 9-millimenter Browning automatic, two of
which hit the Pope. Two bystanders were hit in the attack: Anne Odre, a 60-year old American,
and Rose Hill, a 21-year old Jamaican. The Pope was seriously wounded in the abdomen and
underwent over five hours of surgery, resulting in the removal of part of his intestine. He was
also less seriously wounded in his right arm and his left hand.21 The Pope survived, along with
Odre and Hill.
Mehmet Ali Agca’s history was retraced soon after the assassination attempt. The New
York Times compiled a substantial front-page story and demonstrated a link between Agca and
the Grey Wolves, a neofascist network in Turkey affiliated with the right-wing National Action
Party. While the reconstruction was thorough and justifiable, the major link preceded the failed
assassination bid by two years; Agca was involved in the assassination of Abdi Ipekci, a liberal
Turkish newspaper editor.22 Agca also wrote a letter to a newspaper on November 26, 1979
declaring his intent to assassinate the Pope on his visit to Turkey later that year. While under
interrogation, he explained that it was simply to create a diversion in order to avoid detection;
Agca was nowhere near the Pope during that visit to Turkey.23
The information became more complicated in 1983, when stories began to surface
about a potential Bulgarian connection to the assassination. Inevitably, any Bulgarian involvement
would have implicitly meant Soviet involvement, for Moscow turned to the Bulgarian Durzharna
Sigurnost (DS) when it needed to accomplish a “wet-op.”24 The most famous “wet-op” was the
assassination of Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian dissident living in Britain. In 1978, Markov was
lightly stabbed in the leg by an umbrella, which had been modified to inject a small pellet of
ricin, a highly toxic poison, into its target. Markov died three days later.25
The DS dealt with a critical defection: that of Iordan Mantarov. The March 23,
1983 edition of the New York Times ran a story about Mantarov, who supposedly reported to
French intelligence that the KGB and DS had collaborated on the plot to assassinate the pope.
According to the defector, Soviet intelligence indicated that the pope was “the keystone of a
United States effort to subvert the Polish Government” and move it away from the Communist
bloc. An investigation conducted by the Times concluded that Agca had some connection to the
Bulgarians, including the Bulgarian secret police. The information came from someone close
to Bekir Celenk, a Turkish smuggler who Agca claimed had offered him a substantial sum of
money to kill the pope.26
21

22
23
24

25

26

These were the details, as report in the New York Times’ cover story on May 14, 1981. Most of the original account is undisputed, and there
were many witnesses. “Pope is Shot in Car in Vatican Square,” New York Times, 14 May 1981, A1.
“Gunman in Istanbul Kills a Leading Editor,” New York Times, 2 February 1979, A5.
“Trail of Mehmet Ali Agca: 6 Years of Neofascist Ties,” New York Times, 25 May 1981, A1; Bernstein, His Holiness, 305-6.
Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Secret History (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 639-40. The term “wet-op” referred 		
to operations in which Moscow would prefer to avoid direct involvement due to the potential international or local ramifications.
Yveta Kenety, “The Poison Umbrella,” New Presence: The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs 7 (Winter 2006): 46-48. The Markov 		
story is a very famous one and surfaced a lot in the last few years with the fear of ricin and bioterror.
“Three Bulgarians Linked to Shooting of Pope,” Washington Post, 8 December 1982, A1; “The Attack on the Pope: New Link to 		
Bulgarians,” New York Times, 23 March 1983, A1.

66

The problem was that Mantarov’s story was based on hearsay; he had no direct
involvement in the plot to kill the pope. Moreover, Bulgarian officials immediately refuted the
story, claiming that Mantarov was a maintenance mechanic rather than the deputy commercial
attaché as he had alleged.27 Though confirmed in Time magazine, it does not eliminate the
possibility that Mantarov could have still accessed the information. In his account, Mantarov
stated that he had learned about the plot from a close friend in the DS. Further complicating
matters, Bulgarian émigrés insisted that Mantarov had defected one month prior to the
assassination attempt rather than several months after it, as the Times article had alleged. The
head of French intelligence dispatched a warning to the Vatican in the weeks prior to the
assassination attempt, based on his claim that he had “solid evidence in late April 1981 that an
assassination attempt against the Pope was imminent.” This tip possibly could have come from
Mantarov.28
It is difficult to know which story to accept, because each side had compelling reasons to
hide the truth. Bulgaria wanted to hide any connection to the reviled assassination of a religious
figure, and Mantarov could have thought that giving France more interesting and pertinent
stories would earn him a better arrangement as he defected.
Agca’s story has changed many times; he has blamed the Bulgarian government and
radical Islam, among other causes. Yet it might not be worthwhile to evaluate Agca’s testimony
as important evidence at all. The pope’s spokesman, Dr. Joaquin Navarro-Valls, noted that Agca
probably did not know the details of the conspiracy if there even was a conspiracy, because “it
was done by professionals and professionals don’t leave traces.” One of the prosecutors, Antonio
Marini, noted that “Agca manipulated us all, telling hundreds of lies, continually changed his
story; we have been forced to open tens of different investigations.”29
The fact that Agca had announced his intent to assassinate the pope two years before
the assassination attempt occurred is a strong point against a conspiracy. It is possible, however,
that Agca told the truth about that part of his story. Perhaps his goal was to create a diversion. In
looking to execute the directive from Sofia, Agca might have been recruited simply because the
letter to the newspaper could serve as a “cover-story” in the event of Agca’s capture, in addition to
later providing evidence supporting the theory that Agca operated alone. Additionally, assuming
a conspiracy, one has to consider the reasons behind the selection of Agca over someone else. He
took four shots from a very short distance (less than ten feet away) only to hit his main target
with two, failing to accomplish his objective.30 It is possible, then, that Agca was chosen not
because of his prowess as a gunman, but rather because of his optimal “cover-story.”
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There is also evidence that there was a sharp rise in communications between Bulgaria
and contacts in Italy in the months prior to the assassination. Moreover, communications
suddenly dropped off in the two weeks before it occurred. While on its own, this could be
considered merely coincidental, the fact that there are communications anomalies in addition
to the other evidence implies that it was related to the assassination attempt.31
Recent evidence and conclusions have proven more damning towards the Soviet Union’s
involvement, while also implicating East Germany’s infamous intelligence organization, the Stasi.
Documents released by Stasi provide background about Agca’s history before the assassination.
Agca was trained at a guerrilla camp operated by the renowned international terrorist Ilich
Ramirez Sanchez, also known as “Carlos the Jackal.” Sanchez was affiliated with the Soviet Bloc
through his Separat terrorist network, which was partially sponsored by the KGB and Stasi.
According to Italian Senator Paolo Guzzanti, chairman of a recent investigative commission,
all of “the [Separat] meetings at which terrorism attacks were planned were held in the presence
of officers of the KGB and the Stasi.”32 The same article called Agca’s murder of Abdi Ipekci a
“contract killing” through the Separat network, rather than an ideologically motivated one or
one due to his support for right-wing causes.
More recently, the Mitrokhin Commission, an Italian parliamentary commission
investigating the situation, declared that the Soviet Union assisted in the assassination, using
the descriptive legal phrase “beyond any reasonable doubt.” This accusation was based on new
analysis of photographic evidence. The new evidence indicated that Sergei Ivanov Antonov,
a Bulgarian accused of hiring Agca in the first place, was in St. Peter’s Square during the
assassination attempt. Antonov’s alibi was that he had been in his office during the attempted
assassination, but the new evidence “decisively” disproves that.33 The Commission’s conclusions,
however, must be analyzed with a certain degree of skepticism. A London newspaper report of
the commission’s findings provided the necessary caution, noting,
… the credibility of the report was open to doubt because its author is a close ally
of the Prime Minister. In the past the work of the commission, named after the
KGB double-agent Vassily Mitrokhin who fled to Britain in 1992, has been seen as
a sophisticated effort to stigmatise Italian Communists—once closely linked to the
Soviets—as enemies of Italy and of the Catholic Church. . . . Mr Berlusconi is in
the habit of stigmatising his opponents, political and judicial, as “communists,” and
with a finely balanced general election due in a month, an authoritative-sounding
denunciation of communist perfidy is grist to the electoral mill.34
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This is an important aspect of the situation: even the “fact-finders” and investigators
can have biased interpretations and hidden agendas. The results of the commission should
not be ignored; rather, in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, they should be seriously
considered. Still, Berlusconi’s electoral considerations and strategies should not be overlooked
in the analysis.
One conspiracy theory that Bernstein and Politti discussed and which was posed by
several intelligence professionals was the “Becket scenario,” in which an Eastern European security
service ordered the assassination because of the repeated complaints in the Soviet government.
This patterned the relationship between King Henry II, an English monarch from the twelfth
century, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket. Henry II became intensely
frustrated with an increasingly intractable Becket who was more eager to defend the Church
than to support Henry II. He expressed his outrage in the presence of four knights, bellowing,
“Will no one rid me of this meddlesome priest?” or some variation of that exclamation. The
knights interpreted this as an order and assassinated Becket, against the will of King Henry II. In
a “Becket scenario,” Bulgarian intelligence would have independently planned an assassination
attempt without the explicit consent of Soviet intelligence due to the Soviet Union’s increasing
consternation with John Paul II.35 Although this theory is certainly interesting, the DS was
essentially subordinate to the KGB and it is unlikely that it would have operated on its own.
Additionally, investigations implicate the Soviet Union more directly, and, while the Becket
scenario seems to tie things together neatly, to disregard Soviet complicity completely is too
great a simplification.
It is possible that the original story of Agca’s firm ties to the neofascist Grey Wolves
motivated the assassination. It is also possible that Bulgarian and Soviet denials of involvement
are acceptable and factual. There is too much evidence, however, that indicates a conspiracy of
some sort: Agca’s built-in alibi/justification of his newspaper letter, the Soviet Union’s history
of reliance on Bulgaria’s DS for its “wet-ops,” the communications anomalies between Bulgaria
and Italy, the Mantarov defection, and the recent findings of the Mitrokhin commission. The
Soviet Union also had a clear motive in desiring to eliminate the pope. It could be said that the
Solidarity movement, which was becoming a proverbial thorn in the side of the Soviet Union,
was a direct outgrowth of the Pope’s visit in 1979. Walesa’s use of the pen with the Pope’s likeness
in signing the Gdansk Accords accentuates this point.
So, what forces were actually at work on May 13, 1981? In an article in Time
Magazine from 1983, a top aide to the pope claimed, “The Soviet intention was to cut off
the head of Polish nationalism.”36 The aide’s conclusion is rational. The Soviet Union was
growing increasingly desperate and dismayed from John Paul II’s popularity and impact in an
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increasingly discontented Poland. They had also interpreted John Paul’s election as part of an
American conspiracy. From the Soviet perspective, the pope, who was causing great trouble in
Poland, was not an independent religious figure. He was a mere pawn of Washington, which
was aggressively trying to dislodge Poland from the Soviet Bloc. The humble priest from Poland
was shaking the foundations of the Soviet Empire, something that the Soviet Union could not
accept benignly. Somehow, Poland’s independence movement had to be suppressed, and various
international agreements (Helsinki Accords) and the Gdansk Accords made it increasingly
difficult to repress the movement militarily.37 Quietly, the Soviet Union sought to eliminate
the pope to “decapitate” the movement by removing what it saw as the movement’s spiritual
and symbolic leader.
As it had done in the case of other “wet-ops,” the Soviet KGB assigned the operation
to the Bulgarian DS. In its planning, the DS located an assassin, Mehmet Ali Agca, whose
credential were bolstered by a history of support for right-wing causes, his assassination of a
prominent Turkish liberal, and his published death threat against the pope. Most likely, Agca
was not supposed to survive the mission. The back-story would have provided sufficient motive
in a posthumous investigation: Agca was a mere deranged right-wing terrorist with a personal
mission to assassinate the pope.38
The plan clearly failed. The goal in this mission would have been for two deaths, Pope
John Paul II and Mehmet Ali Agca, but neither figure died. The investigations have consistently
confirmed Bulgarian involvement, and it is too difficult to envision a scenario in which the
Bulgarian DS would have acted against the wishes of the KGB. While it is quite possible that
the truth could differ from this interpretation, the evidence points in favor of a broad conspiracy
in the attempted assassination of John Paul II.
The Triumph of Wojtyla and the Lessons of Involvement
Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis is quick to credit Pope John Paul II with
catalyzing the fall of communism in Poland.39 Biographers Bernstein and Politti take a more
guarded view, agreeing with the pope’s assessment that communism had imploded due to its
own weaknesses.40 Still, it can be seen that the worst fears of the communist leadership, for one
reason or another, had been realized: the system collapsed, and John Paul II and Poland were
among the major contributors to that collapse.
It is easy to criticize the so-called “conspiracy theories” of a Soviet-driven assassination
plot against the pope because, on the surface, the assassination attempt does not seem like a
37
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rational action. Yet the evidence appears to indicate that the Soviet Union had a clear, rational
motive for eliminating the pope: its own survival. The fact that the Soviet Union collapsed
merely ten years after the failed assassination is compelling in its own right; in a way, it proves
that the accuracy of their political calculation. In the mind of the Soviet leadership, the pope
constituted a direct threat to its Communist bloc, and the only way to address the problem was
to eliminate him.
The conclusions of recent investigations, even with their political motivations, should
not be ignored. Evidence existed long before investigations concluded a Soviet-led conspiracy.
Furthermore, Agca’s links to Bulgaria have been established. There was a clear motive for the
Soviet Union to address the situation violently, as they viewed the Pope’s agenda as a critical
threat to their position. Finally, there was precedent for the Soviet Union addressing its “stickiest”
problems by sending its “wet-ops” to Bulgaria’s DS.
In a court of law, it would be difficult to prove Soviet involvement in the attempted
assassination of the pope. Historically, however, the facts appear to support Soviet involvement,
at least on some level. Accepting Soviet involvement in a plot is beneficial for analyzing certain
aspects of the Soviet government, like how Soviet concerns in Politburo meetings possibly
translated into covert activity, or how the Soviet government viewed the Solidarity movement,
or how officials miscalculated American capabilities, or how officials underestimated John Paul
II individually.
The attempted assassination of the pope appears to have been sanctioned by the Soviet
Union as a way to combat the “counter-revolution” in Poland. It was an act of desperation,
but, considering the impact of the pope and the Polish crisis, from the Soviet perspective it is
certainly understandable.41
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